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I Introduction: Problems of Definition 
1. Space 
In contemporary ethnohistorical studies of Southeast Asia, the 'zone' and/ or 'border' have recently 
become chosen metaphors for theorising the historically complex and contradictory ways in which 
cultural difference and ethnic diversity have been articulated in social relations and in political and 
economic practise across time. This paper aims to explore global cultural interconnections and 
interdependencies in the Southeast Asian world of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
with particular reference to the 'Sulu Zone' [Dick 1993: 6; Warren 1981]. The paper also aims 
to enhance critical understanding and discussion of historiographical methods and models used in 
problematizing of economic and cultural 'border zones' in a changing global-local context. My 
emphasis is on a 'zone' created through the intersections of geography, culture and history cen-
tered around the Sulu and Celebes seas, as well as China's and the West's complicated place within 
it. 
As cross-cultural flows of trade goods, technology, people and information intensified in speed 
and volume in late eighteenth century Southeast Asia, the localised borders of states and economic 
regions were becoming ever more porous. Did the world capitalist economy at that time create 
'borderless worlds'? Or did borders - cultural, national or otherwise prove to be more resistant 
and tenacious or vulnerable to the European presence and economic expansion? As some borders 
broke down, others were erected, both between and within nations, states and empires. For ex-
ample, while Sulu desperately wanted to become a part of the East Asian global-regional economy 
and Britain's 'push into Asia', Chinese exclusivism and xenophobia were on the rise in the region. 
The southern Chinese border was forced open to the west in the 1840s, but new 'borders' had 
already been forged or imposed in the Sulu region and elsewhere in eastern Indonesia because of 
the China connection and economic conditions in that particular area. While captive labour power 
from all across Southeast Asia was introduced into the 'Zone's' space, comprising the Sultanate's 
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fisheries and tropical forests, the boundaries of its economy, culture, and ecology were increasingly 
blurred by the rhetoric and practise of global trade, cultural pluralism and western Imperialism. 
A 'Zone', like that of the Sulu Sultanate, was not just a 'spatial' site of economic, cross-cultural 
and symbolic contact. Such a zone was both a meeting ground and arena of potential antagonism 
and conflict in which peoples geographically and historically separated came into contact with one 
another and often established ongoing relations; a 'zone' where two or more cultures rubbed up 
against one another due to events going on beyond its geographic borders, where people of differ-
ent origins and ethnicity came to occupy the 'contact' space and/ or historical territory, where lower, 
middle and upper classes touched involving possible conditions of coercion, inequality and 
conflict. How were such 'zones' or 'border worlds', geographically and culturally defined, affirmed 
and contested, and transgressed? What impact did the China tea trade and the world capitalist 
economy have on both the making, physical and symbolic, and unmaking, of Taosug society and 
culture and the 'Sulu Zone' from the late eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth century? The 
ethnohistorically based arguments, evidentiary examples and other presentations in this paper tackle 
these questions from a variety of theoretical, historical and empirical perspectives based on my 
earlier research on the world of the Sulu Sultanate. Together they vividly illuminate how contem-
porary culture and society was determined by 'globalisation·; the continuous flow of cross cultural 
trade and interactions both within and between several large geo-economic 'cores' and smaller 
'zones', involving in this case China, Britain and the Sulu Sultanate and thousands of separate smaller 
places. 
The Sulu Zone constituted a Southeast Asian economic region with a multi-ethnic pre-colonial 
Malayo-Muslim state, and an ethnically heterogeneous set of societies of diverse political back-
grounds and alignments that could be set within a stratified hierarchy of kinship oriented stateless 
societies, maritime nomadic fishers and forest dwellers [Warren 1981: xix-xxvi]. In terms of 
the international trade economy, the 'Sulu Zone' was not an important economic region until the 
end of the eighteenth century. In part, the paper will attempt to explain how the 'Zone' emerged, 
acquired a shape and became as it was during the period under consideration. It is equally con-
cerned to present the 'Sulu Zone' as an example of the way a redistributive economic system oper-
ated on the periphery of the global political economy of Asia in its heyday, before it fell under 
complete domination of the West. The key articulating unit in this seemingly small inconsequen-
tial economic network was a strong regional sultanate; in the case of Sulu, set in a political and 
ecological framework that served to integrate the economic activity and resources of ethnically 
diverse and often politically divided groups, and, smaller subregions, that would supply the larger 
markets in China and the west with exotic marine and forest commodities. 
The Sultanate's entrepot, at Jolo, integrated supply and distribution of manufactured and ex-
ported industrial goods such as textiles, weapons, porcelain and opium emanating from powerful 
state systems in particular the core areas of Europe and China. In terms of economic multifunc-
tionality, the Sulu Zone did not manufacture or export industrial products on any scale.1> However, 
1) In terms of the geographical concept of 'central-place theory' and its implications for hierarchy and 
multifunctionality see the pioneering historical analysis of Skinner [1964 ; 1977]. 
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the 'Zone' and all of its subregions became part of the world capitalist economy with an international 
monetary system based on silver and gold; tea, slaves and opium were to play a critically important 
regional role in a global economic equation involving ever expanding markets, patterns of con-
sumption and events going on beyond its geographic borders. The Sulu Sultanate is an important 
case study of an island entrepot state that suddenly grew over several decades from being a second-
ary principality based on fishing and 'piracy', located on the eastern edge of island Southeast Asia, 
into one of the most powerful and important pre-colonial trading states of the entire Malayo-Muslim 
'zone' of Southeast Asia (present day Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern Philippines), where my 
earlier research was focused. 
Two factors governed the aims of the international trade economy between the west and China, 
namely, the location of marine and forest products for the Canton market, and, the potential ways to 
acquire them, using the strategies of cross-cultural trade and access from the seas. Given avail-
able nautical technology and the application of naval strength the seas were the natural avenues for 
western traders and travelers to intrude into the affairs of Southeast Asia, as they were in Northeast 
Asia. Three water borne routes led into the heart of the Sulu Zone. The Chinese began with the 
Sulu sea, an extension southward from their trade entrepots in the Philippines, but they also navi-
gated across the South China sea through the Palawan passage, while the Bugis mariners sailed 
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north through the Celebes sea into the Zone. In this context, if one ignores traditional political 
boundaries and views these seas as unifying rather than divisive agents- 'great connectors' -
strategically extending across the regions key shipping routes, a strong case could be made for 
regarding the 'Zone' as one of the final, albeit, critically important extremities of the world capitalist 
economy in Eastern Asia. 
Among the richest sources of marine and forest products in the Zone were the strand environ-
ments and wilderness regions situated just south of the Sulu Archipelago, along the northeast coast 
of Borneo. The economic processes and historical events bound up with the intensifying flow of 
trade commodities, people and technology must also take into account the specialist role of the 
more remote highlanders and insular maritime fishers as they were increasingly drawn into the 
collecting and processing activities associated with the world capitalist economy and the economic 
life of the Zone. Unlike other parts of Southeast Asia, the upland tribal economies of Borneo and 
Mindanao were not tangential to the accelerated commercial activity taking place between the 
entrepot atJolo and the city of Canton, which were all part of an inter-related subsystem of a greater 
global-regional whole. Nevertheless, in spite of a particularly dense pattern of Bornean riverine 
settlement that supplied this larger market and seaborne trade with commodities like birds nest, 
camphor, wax, sago and gold, much of the interior of southern and eastern Borneo and the central 
dividing range was largely uninhabited, though parts were regarded as Bugis trading grounds and 
also served as a buffer between themselves and Taosug traders to the north [Warren 1981 : 10-11, 
76, 84-90]. 
Across the landscapes of the Zone cultural-ecological difference and social inequality facili-
tated trade between tribal uplanders and hunters and gatherers in the innermost recesses of the 
forest interior, who wanted to avoid conflict. Because the China tea trade centered on Jolo after 
1768, Kenyah and Kayan speakers of Borneo's east coast tropical forests and the Subanun of 
Mindanao's southern plateau were increasingly drawn into more extensive trade contacts with 
Taosug and Bugis along the coastline and in the river mouths. The local economies and lifeways 
of these vigorous slash and burn agriculturalists were thoroughly commercialised as they sent 
down the rivers volumes of surplus wax, camphor and birds nest in return for salt, textiles and 
minor manufactured goods. 
Hence, my approach to framing and re-presenting the ethnohistory of the Sulu Zone on its own 
terms from the late eighteenth century, rather than merely as a corollary of the history of western 
imperial expansion in Eastern Asia, was to tease out the economic, cultural and ecological intercon-
nections embedded in the world capitalist economy with particular reference to the evolution of the 
'Zone'. This broad conceptual schema aimed to enhance understanding of these global systemic 
links and interactions between geo-political core areas, notably China and Europe, and strategically 
positioned 'zones' with strong trading bases and thin populations like the Sultanates, which encom-
passed a variety of economic sub-regions and extremely specialised territories.2> 
2) For a comparable example of how economic multifunctionality, hierarchy and 'globalisation' functioned in 
an earlier period using 'Southeast Asia' as the unit of reference see Curtin [1984: 128-129] and Reid 
[1988; 1993]. 
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2. Center and Periphery 
Initially, it was scholars of European social and economic history, especially those associated with 
the Annales School and its towering leader Femand Braude!, who aimed to explore the complex 
system, structure and changes of the modem World Order [Burke 1990]. The Annales move-
ment promoted a new kind of problem oriented interdisciplinary history which embraced an ac-
count of the whole range of human activities- 'total' history. The distinctive innovative concepts 
and methods of the Annales group were achieved by full collaboration with other disciplines-
notably geography, economics, sociology and anthropology [ibid. : 12-31; Bloch 1992 ; Braudel 
1980 : 25-164]. The conceptual framework and spatial concepts of Braudel's 'Mediterranean Eu-
rope' and his work on Material Civilization, Economy and Capitalism formed part of an increasingly 
complicated portrait of the origins of European expansion and capitalism [Braudel 1972 ; 1979; 
journal of Modern History 1972]. 
The absolutely unprecedented level of social and technological power of the West fostered the 
complex, internal changes which enabled it to emerge as the 'core' area or 'centre' of the world 
economic system after the fifteenth century with the growth of capitalism and of commercial agri-
culture in western Europe. By the nineteenth century, the modem World System was well estab-
lished as the West took full advantage of the industrial revolution drawing most of the world into the 
orbit of west European and north American capitalism and colonialism. In contemporary histori-
cal studies, semi-periphery and periphery have become conceptual analytic metaphors for theorising 
and understanding the complex sometimes, albeit, contradictory parallel processes of integration 
and transmutation in Asia, Africa and Latin America between "international and parochial systems, 
universal and local cultures" [Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 24]. But far less is known about the 
internal processes of change which accompanied and underlay the interlocking of Southeast Asian 
economic regions and sets of societies into the world capitalist system as 'peripheral', 'satellite' 
and/ or 'secondary' states. The development of geographically and culturally distinct economic 
sub regions such as the 'Sulu Zone', was part of a global inter-regional process of integration and 
change with unexpected local implications and insecurities, as western core powers deprived the 
vast majority of states and societies of the rest of the world of some or all of their autonomy. 
The concept of 'periphery' which stresses inter-regional relationships, processes and inter-
connections, developed relatively recently out of the historiographical formulations and debates of 
the neo-marxist dependency theorists, particularly Andre Gunder Frank and Paul Baran, and the 
world system approach of Immanuel Wallerstein [Baran 1957; Frank 1978; Wallerstein 1974]. 
Like them, I was interested in the decisive altering of patterns and contexts of historical action 
whereby a core or metropolis expropriated economic surplus from its periphery or satellites and 
appropriated it for its own economic development. This concept of a world system constructed 
from thousands of separate market transactions and exchange relations forming an integral part of 
some lock-step pattern of the global capitalist economy meant for most non-western societies that 
"the same forces that built up the economies and cultures in the advanced lands broke down theirs, 
and they became 'underdeveloped' lands, those with relatively low investment levels" [Hodgson 
197 4 : 203]. However, there were some economically powerful, peripheral, secondary states based 
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on ascendant wealth and specialisation, notably Sulu, that proved an exception to the rule. In 
order to account for the local-regional dynamic of social arrangements and representations, values 
and events, and sequence of changes over several generations, I used a 'centre periphery' model; a 
conceptual framework that effectively integrated the histories of Europe, North America and Asia to 
comprehend the shifting nature of relationships involving internal and international social, eco-
nomic and political changes both within and between the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral soci-
eties of West Europe, China, and the Sulu Zone, respectively. 
Careful examination of the inapplicability of certain western terminology and categories -
'piracy', 'slavery' and the 'state'- enabled me to analyse the economic and political dynamics of a 
Malayo-Muslim state and how it was transformed by global trade, and the rapid advance of imperi-
alism and modernity. I wanted to resolve an apparent paradox in Southeast Asian history about 
'piracy' and politics in the Malayo-Muslim world and European imperial policy and expansion in the 
region; the paradox that the rise of the Sulu Sultanate, increased maritime slave raiding, and, the 
opening and imminent decline of China at the hands of Europe took place at much the same time, at 
the end of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, as the introduction of tea in 
Europe, and the fact that tea was unknown in India or theW est, except as an important consumable 
from China [Hobhouse 1992:95; Sutherland 1995: 133-146]. Europe's insatiable desire for this 
commodity by the end of the eighteenth century was to change the face of Asian history and shape 
the future destinies of both Sulu and China as areas that could ascend to the 'core' or descend to the 
periphery of the world capitalist system. Combining the theories and concepts of Latin American 
economists and Annales historians, I demonstrated that the price of development of global trade in 
Eastern Asia included not only opium smuggling and the destruction of China but also intensifica-
tion of slavery in the Sulu Zone as part of the new division of international labour between 'core' and 
'periphery'. In this context, the genesis ofSulu's seemingly paradoxical capacity for internal trans-
formation and social reproduction as a 'traditional society', is perhaps, best understood as a series of 
intersections, encounters or "historical accidents usually due to contact with foreign formations" 
[Meillassoux 1972 : 101]. In a very real sense, the history of late eighteenth century Eastern Asia 
was in fact a history of the continuing integration of the world capitalist system of ever more regions 
and specialised territories of the world. 
The world system came to dominate the Sulu Sultanate and its environs. Chinese demand for 
exotic commodities, now of great interest to Europeans, encouraged both the establishment and 
'take off of subregional trade networks and the production of goods. New entrepots emerged, 
especially in the area of the Sulu sea and Borneo. The island of J olo became a major centre for 
cross-cultural trade in the recent history of Eastern Asia and the Sulu Sultanate flourished. The 
Taosug were suddenly locked into a vast web of trade and exchange involving the exploitation of 
the rich tropical resources of the area, with producers, distributors and controllers involved in a 
complex set of relationships and structural dependency. Within the Zone centres of distribution 
and exchange developed and, in association with the development of larger inter-regional markets, 
capital flows and technology transfers international trade increased and the Sultanate established 
itself as a major entrepot. The trading networks in the Zone rapidly grew in scale and complexity 
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and the fortunes of everyone involved in exchange and redistribution became linked with the politi-
cal and economic fortunes of Europe and the China tea trade. 
My initial thinking about how the late eighteenth century global economy created a 'borderless 
world' or 'zone', both spatially and historically, in the area of the Sulu and Celebes seas, owes much 
to the influence of John Smail's thought, who, in tum, had been strongly indebted to the hemi-
spheric cross-regional historical orientation of Marshall Hodgson. Templates for the 'zone' and 
possible center-periphery models were provided by the seminal works of E.R Leach, Fernand 
Braudel and Andre Gunder Frank.3J The inherent advantages of such a theoretical evolutionary-
ecological approach for framing and interpretation in an upland agricultural context were already 
apparent to me in Leach's pioneering work on the political systems of highland Burma. In the 
Sulu context, however, Southeast Asia was a region in which the sea served as a major means of 
communication for a wider inter-regional economy in which national boundaries were fluid and by 
no means fixed [Dick 1993 : 1]. Following in the footsteps of Leach and Braudel, I abandoned the 
blinkered geographic perspective of earlier historians of the Philippines, Indonesia and Borneo, for 
a more dynamic definition of the Sulu Sultanate's boundaries. It was based on larger scale proc-
esses of social change and a 'borderless' history of a global maritime trade network oriented toward 
China, Europe and North America as part of the same world system. To be released from the 
conceptual constraints of conventional historical geography, I called this wide ranging web of eco-
nomic influence and interpersonal relations that centered on the Sulu Sultanate a 'Zone'. 
3. Time 
I now want to speak briefly of a 'regional time', having examined the spatial system; the creation of 
a 'zone' delineated both by space and by time, whose essence and demarcation came with the spread 
of commodities, technology, ideas and practices of the world capitalist economy and western Impe-
rialism, as two halves of the same process. The Sulu Zone as a regional 'spatial' system and social 
order, like the economy it represented, was not atemporal. My framing and interpretation of the 
'zone' as a spatial system rested on the axiom that it was "inherently unstable and generally dy-
namic" [Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 22]. And, that it was thrust on to the global stage at a 
specific moment or era in 'regional time'. Leach's remarkable work on state and community struc-
tures in highland Burma aimed at tracing the pattern of the shifting balance between two represen-
tations of political order and social phenomena over some 150 years. Similarly, for myself, the 
'Zone' was also 'a process in time' [Leach 1954 : 4, 212] : a recognition that all ethnic groups and 
communities were being shaped and re-shaped by the interplay between internal social and cultural 
forms and ongoing, external courses of action. In a very real sense, the peoples of the 'Zone' were 
in fact 'products' of large scale processes of global socio-economic change which had made them 
what they were and continued to make them what they would become in reaction to the uncontrol-
lable and rapid impact of these forces. The holism of the zone as a 'spatial system' was posited, 
3) On the impact of]ohn Smail's ideas about historical writing on Southeast Asia see Sears [1993]; Braudel 
[1972); Frank [1978] ; Hodgson [1993] ; Leach [1954] ; Tachimoto [1995], for a discussion of the influ-
ence of the Annalistes on historians of early Southeast Asia see Aung-Thwin [ 1995]. 
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both as a model and a necessary analytic fiction, not given. The invisible connections linking the 
process of structural change and dynamic movement of local systems and networks of this 'Zone' to 
the wider economic and political world (s) of which it was becoming a part had to be traced and 
explained in 'regional time'. 
Braude! and his French colleagues - writing what some called 'geohistory' - have empha-
sized long term patterns rather than 'eventism', devoting considerable attention to social and eco-
nomic developments. In his work on the Mediterranean world (a cross-regional spatial system), 
in the later sixteenth century, Braudel argues that historical changes took place at different 
speeds. He distinguished three speeds and devoted a section of his masterpiece to each [Burke 
1992 : 152]. First is the time of 'Geohistory'; the relations between humans and their environment, 
"a history whose passage is almost imperceptible." Braudel in describing the sea basin as a com-
plex ecological mosaic called this 'historie structurale'. Secondly, the time of 'economic systems, 
states, societies and civilizations', with its 'slow but recognisable rythmns'. Here, he analysed an 
extraordinary variety of topics including patterns of migration and trade, town life, crafts, festivals, 
the lives of peasants and the activities of merchants, and demography. Finally, there was the fast 
moving time of events and individuals. The Sulu Zone focused on the period from the end of the 
eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth. The basic pattern over this period was one of 
phenomenal growth for the Sultanate leading to gradual decline but which in turn did not lead to 
recovery at the beginning of this century. Braudel's time of 'geohistory', " ... a history of constant 
repetition, ever-recurring cycles," was essential for the creation of the regional 'space' or 'Zone', but 
it was the second time, 'historie conjuncturelle', which was most relevant here, concerned as it is 
with historical changes to economic, political and social structures [Burke 1990: 39-42]. For ex-
ample, the economic, social and environmental ramifications of Sulu and China's inextricable in-
volvement in a dynamic global economy was an important harbinger of the momentous changes 
beginning to occur all over Eastern Asia between 1768 and 1848. With explosive speed, West 
Europeans spread out to trade and colonize various regions and states of Southeast Asia. When 
Englishmen like Dalrymple, Rennel, Forrest and others first came to Sulu in the 1760s they recog-
nized that the 'Zone' was a potentially inexhaustible source of natural commodities for the China tea 
trade. They soon learned too that Taosug datus and other leading inhabitants of this region would 
exchange these products for manufactured industrial goods in return. Eager to extract natural 
resources from this virtually unchartered area, European merchants extended their international 
trade network and knowledge of the world to the 'Zone', after 1768. The speed of historical change 
is important here. The reverberations from the shock waves of Braudel's time of 'economic sys-
tems and states' emanating from events on the southeast coast of China, as a result of the intersec-
tions of the world capitalist economy, were felt especially early in the Sulu Archipelago. Britain's 
efforts to increasingly open up China to foreign trade while trying to negotiate the impossibility of 
'living with difference' between discrepant empires and cultures in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, led to a 'historie conjuncturelle' by which the 'Sulu Zone' came to reveal itself as it was. 4> For 
4) The exact phrase from Dumont is "history is the movement by which society reveals itself as what it is" 
[Dumont 1957: 21]. 
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me this new age or 'regional time' was first of all in my mind; I had needed new eyes to see the 'Zone' 
now taking shape so rapidly after 1768 in the area of the Sulu Archipelago. 
These central factors of space and time highlighted the methodological difficulties involved in 
conceptualizing a history of Southeast Asia that stressed internal and international inter-relation-
ships while, at the same time, integrating the global scene with the local one, with particular refer-
ence to an economic sub-region like the 'Zone'. In the beginning, I faced a serious challenge, since 
it seemed almost impossible to master all the sources and knowledge required in order to develop 
a well-documented ethno-historically oriented world system analysis. 5> Only with a radical shift in 
my historical and geographical perspective and thinking about that part of the maritime world was 
it possible to seriously contemplate undertaking this pioneering revisionist task. Both Leach and 
Hodgson carefully demonstrated in their stimulating books that the initial step was to avoid use of 
geographical terms and units necessarily defined by the political boundaries of the time and the 
epistemological assumptions of orientalism and civilizational studies [Hodgson 1993 : 295]. Like 
the Annales Group, I am fascinated by geography - I have been researching a history of Philippine 
typhoons for the past 15 years. However, the making of The Sulu Zone was closer to an 'ecohistory' 
than to the Annales School's 'Geohistory', because a primary concern of the monograph is with the 
relation between social groups, like the Samal Laut, Iranun, Balangingi Samal and Taosug, and their 
physical environment. I also placed more emphasis on demography than Braudel did in his clas-
sic study of the Mediterranean basin because the 'real motor of social change' was population. 
Slavery and dependent labour were not solely economic institutions which enabled the late eigh-
teenth century expansion of the Sulu state and domination of the regional trade network and/ or 
'Zone'. Slavery and the accomplishment of ethnicity had virtually become the very basis of organ-
ized society in the Sultanate. 
I also had to focus paradigmatically on identifying the salient threads of the local, inter-regional 
and global patterns and their inter-connections in order to render the history of the Zone as more 
than the sum of its parts. The maritime populations that were dependent on the sea for their 
economic pursuits - trading, raiding, collecting and fishing- remained largely caricatures in the 
historiography of the region, their origins and development, relationships with each other, their 
loosely integrated regional economies dominated by the institutions slave raiding and cross-cul-
tural trade, and their adjustments to external forces were largely written about from between 'insu-
lar blinkers'. To rectify the errors and pre-suppositions of earlier studies, I developed a method-
ologically self-conscious ethno-history utilizing a global, cultural-ecological perspective where all 
states and societies could be seen at once and their inter-connectedness to one another within the 
framework of the world economic system became clear [Warren 1981: xi-xvi, 252-255]. It is 
crucial to understanding the more flexible inclusive approach required to write The Sulu Zone that 
it was based on devising a new explicit conceptual framework. A paradigm of sorts - a broad, 
loose but nonetheless coherent explanation and model about the nature of a Southeast Asian eco-
nomic region that grew out of connections and relationships with the 'modern' world system from 
5) I used 24 archives or other repositories, located on three continents, whose manuscripts were used in the 
preparation of the thesis on which my book is based. 
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the end of the eighteenth century. Apart from offering an overall perspective and understanding 
of these global-regional inter-relationships, the role of the Zone configuration provided the major 
principle of framing and organization of the narrative; it was the essential background against which 
to begin unraveling the main elements in the development of these separate but increasingly re-
lated inter-regional and local histories of society and culture in Eastern Asia. 
4. Redistribution 
The works of Wallerstein, Frank, Wolf and Curtin postulate cross-cultural trade and exchange as 
arguably the most important extrinsic factor in stimulating the development, change and inter-con-
nectedness of societies and cultures around the globe [Curtin 1984:41; Wolf 1982]. Their view 
of the modern world as a complex changing macro system must take account of a wide variety of 
local factors to understand center-periphery relations- the political economy of power, patronage 
and privilege being the most critical factor- in studying the world capitalist economy as the domi-
nant force in the evolution of the modem world. There is also a common desire in the holistic 
explanations of these global historians and social theorists to demonstrate how social, political and 
economic change of core areas and peripheral societies were shaped by their 'central value system' 
and the central institutional system which it legitimated [Burke 1992 : 82]. Like the above advo-
cates of global history and the world system approach, most scholars of the region see the late 
eighteenth century Southeast Asian world, consisting of several types of central institutional sys-
tems or state formations. The American sociologist Edward Shils is perhaps the best known expo-
nent of the 'central value system' concept which so profoundly influenced Clifford Geertz in his 
provocative interpretation of divine kinship in nineteenth century Bali and the theory of the 'exem-
plary centre' [Shils 1975 : 2]. This first type of political system was characterized by the sacrality, 
drama and organized spectacle of the ruling social order- by what Geertz calls the 'expressive 
nature' of this kind of centrality {Geertz 1980: 121-123]. 
The second type of political system is based on redistribution. Braudel's work on material life 
and capitalism in early modem times, Curtin's formulations about economic change in pre-colonial 
Africa in the era of the slave trade, and my own study of change over more than a century which 
focuses on the seafaring populations of a Southeast Asian economic region all owe an intellectual 
debt to the economic theory and ideas of Karl Polanyi about modes of exchange [Polanyi et al. 1957 ; 
Polanyi 1966] .6> One important mode was 'reciprocity', another was 'redistribution'. It is impor-
tant to note too that in Polanyi's view both these types of transactions as historical modes of organiz-
ing economies were neither mutually exclusive of one another nor the market economy. Polanyi's 
system of redistribution depends on social hierarchy and a tributary mode of production and ex-
change where goods flowed into the 'center' of an empire, state or 'zone' engendering distinctions 
of rank, privilege and patronage among tribute takers and flowed out again to the producers of 
tribute on the 'periphery' in the provinces, hinterlands or frontiers. The mobilization of social 
labour to reproduce the dynamic and social conditions for the proliferation of a political system 
6) See also Bohannan and Dalton [1965]; Curtin [1975: 235]. 
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based on 'redistribution' gives rise to military and political competition between contending social 
groups and segments of society, to control trade with the outside world, and, labour power [Wolf 
1982: 386]. 
A central institutional system based on a redistributive mode of production and exchange en-
abled traders like those of eighteenth century Dahomey and the Taosug datus of the Sulu Sultanate 
to acquire and monopolize both the goods and trade of outsiders- wealth -that built influence 
and prestige-power. In both these 'peripheral' societies redistribution became the dominant pat-
tern of integration and mode of transaction as they were drawn into economic exchange relations of 
a world market economy and trade with Europeans. ] olo as a 'port of trade' was an entrepot and 
town where cross-cultural trade had often taken place but the scale of this type of commerce was 
always comparatively small up until the latter part of the eighteenth century.7> For the Sultan, with 
his capital located on the seacoast, the entrepot and 'Zone' incorporated a set of cultural-institutional 
practices typical of centralised states based on 'redistribution' for the production and acquisition of 
goods, on the one hand, and kinship, warfare and other forms of organisation and culture on the 
other. 
The south Fukienese people occupying one end of a busy north-south maritime trading route 
and world -the Amoy network on the South China coast- had maintained direct contact with the 
Sulu Sultanate and eastern parts of the archipelago since the beginning of the eighteenth century 
[Chin-Keong 1983]. For the Taosug this contact provided the initial outlet for their marine and 
forest produce, especially tripang, pearls and birds nest for the return cargo of the south China 
junks. More importantly, for the coastal leaders the expanding trade by mid-century made Jolo a 
key 'port of trade' for shipping directly to China. While the scale of this type of commerce was still 
comparatively small in the first half of the eighteenth century and it remained chiefly in south Chi-
nese hands, Europeans, especially British tea traders, in order to expand their commercial contacts 
with China, actively encouraged a smuggling trade with Taosug merchants and Bugis traders from 
1768 onwards which rapidly built up this small state and its redistributional economy [Warren 1981 : 
17-66]. The organisation of the economy of the Sulu Sultanate and its 'Zone' were increasingly 
based on the distribution of imported goods and the corresponding centralisation of their products 
for sale and exchange in the global trade network of the region, and, on sea not land power. 
These relations between Jolo's emerging inter-regional economy and society and the numer-
ous smaller towns, villages and trade centres scattered throughout the Zone were effectively con-
trolled by the Taosug elite. The commercial activities of even the most far flung communities 
dotting the margins of the Zone's redistributive economic system were often dominated by Taosug 
chiefs or their representatives. Local notables emerged as formal political relations with commu-
nities involved in inter-regional trade were forged through bonds of kinship and marriage. Slaves 
collected from the Christian population of the Philippine provinces and eastern Indonesia were also 
recruited into a meritocratic system of local administration as the trade frontier of the Zone ap-
peared to expand indefinitely [ibid. : 223]. jolo as a rising 'port-polity' could only sustain cross-
7) On the concept of the 'port of trade' see Curtin [1984: 12-14]; Polanyi et al. [1957: 38-63, 114-153, 117-
187]. 
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cultural trade on a large scale for an extended period by exploiting the natural resources and labour 
power of these peripheral communities. The collection of the products of the archipelago from 
dominated settlements paid for itself because it enabled the Sultanate to sustain its organised mari-
time military power until the supply of captive slaves for recruitment into the redistributive economy 
began to dwindle from 1848 onwards. 
The ascendancy of the Taosug merchants on the northeast coast of Borneo was in part at the 
expense of rival trading interests, especially pioneering Bugis from towns further south along the 
Mahakam river pushing north towards the edge of the Zone. Ethnic integration into the inter-
regional procurement trade was no less remarkable than the extent and complexity of the system 
itself. Maritime nomadic fishermen and trained slaves specialised in harvesting the seas and reefs 
surrounding numerous islets and atolls. The Islamised orang sungai were mobilised to procure 
camphor, wax and rattan, while coastal and riverine dwelling groups seasonally collected birds nest 
of uncommon value for Taosug. Effective authority at the southern extremity of the Zone was 
limited. The Buginese did not allow the Taosug to gain full political control on the southern rivers. 
Nevertheless, despite Taosug-Bugis conflict and trade rivalry there developed a lively local traffic 
between contested areas as well as with Sulu's redistributional economy centered on Jolo. 
This late eighteenth century intrusion of the world capitalist economy was not resisted by the 
Taosug who made their society relatively open to outside influences and social change, but, largely 
on their terms. The coastal traders were mostly aristocrats who recognised the advantage in ac-
cepting and 'borrowing' foreign technology, new ideas, luxury imports and trade goods. The im-
pact of this maritime expansion and growing influence of the outside world on Taosug political 
organisation was significant. The rapid increase in trade goods and revenues, and the control and 
dissemination of improved firearms to mobile marauding communities residing in the Zone, en-
couraged the development of a more coercive bureaucratically organised economy and state 
[Lieberman 1995 : 797]. 
What the Europeans and Chinese sought at J olo and from the fisheries and forests of the Zone 
was, above all, tripang, pearls and birds nest. Between 1768 and 1848 hundreds of vessels visited 
Jolo, almost all of them trading in either one or two seasons. Tripang was obtained, at first, in 
return for cloth, clothing, iron and other metals; soon after for gunpowder, musket and cannon. The 
Taosug traders were mostly coastal datus or 'chiefs' who mobilised their factions and contacts 
throughout the Zone to deliver the products, and whose power and wealth grew together with the 
development of the trade. One must note here, however, that this rapid trade expansion did not 
entirely dovetail with pre-existing Sulu circuits of exchange, as their basic structure was altered 
somewhat by global-regional trade, Islam and the way slavery could be used to bring in more 
commodities. Of particular importance for Sulu were guns and gunpowder and other imported 
manufactures, textiles and also opium which contributed to the Sultanate's centralising coercive 
power and integration of the economy with other social institutions. Taosug merchants or chiefs 
on the coast and their descendants developed an extensive redistributive trade in which they wrested 
the function of the collection and distribution of commodities for the China tea trade from tradi-
tional competitors - the Sultanates of Brunei and Cotabato. This inter-regional commerce - in-
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volving trade with the Bugis of Samarinda to the south, with Manila to the north, and with Singapore 
to the west - formed a complex set of inter-relationships, entangled commodities and transactions 
through which the Sultanate was able to consolidate its dominance over the outlying areas of the 
Zone along the northeast Borneo and western Mindanao coasts. 
However, the relationship between trade, power and culture -the meaning of force -was 
wholly different in the Sulu world of the 1760s that Dalrymple encountered than that depicted in 
Marryt's stunning portrait of an 1840s 'Malay Chief of Jolo whose wealth and power was by then 
based on the careful regulation of global-local trade. It is clear that particular goods traded to a 
Taosug datu in 1768, goods that carried prestige as well as consumption value, were catalyst for a 
wholly different set of possible political and social interactions from those traded to Taosug mer-
chants in the 1840s. In the 1760s, for example, never far from the surface was the intent of gaining 
alliance and wealth by redistributing merchandise such as opium for purposes of politics and 
prestige. Opium in the 1760s had not yet been adapted into a Taosug system of practice and belief, 
it had no ritual or ceremonial role. Opium traded to a Taosug leader at the peak of the redistribu-
tive network of the 1840s was a different matter. In less than two generations, partly due to the 
interdependent ecological balance of the Zone, the China tea trade and the world economy had 
become a road to riches and power for the strategically located Taosug; both aristocrats and mer-
chants could make an exceptional living. Yet, ironically to many of these wealthy Taosug, opium 
was now less a business than an addiction - a sinister friend and a new way of life. The trade in 
opium by then had wreaked a devastating social transformation almost as significant for under-
standing the meaning of force, and, reframing the idea of culture itself and heterodox practices, as 
the technological and social innovations introduced by improved firearms. 
By 1800 redistribution had become the organising pattern of the regional economy of the Sulu 
Sultanate. Indirectly, it was a demand for tea that could not be satisfied that animated European 
interest in Sulu's commodities and its sudden rise to regional primacy. During the eighteenth 
century tea replaced ale as the national beverage in England and was especially popular among the 
artisan and labouring classes. China was almost the sole supplier of aromatic tea to England. The 
British were quick to recognise the potential of participation in the long standing Sino-Sulu trade as 
a means of redressing the one-way flow of silver from India to China. Marine and jungle products, 
highly valued in China, were needed to stem it. Sulu's ascendancy towards the end of the eigh-
teenth century developed out of global economic inter-connections and inter-dependencies of the 
world capitalist economy between British India, Southeast Asia and China. Commercial and tribu-
tary activity became linked with long distance maritime slave raiding and incorporation of captured 
peoples in a redistributive system which made J olo a principal entrepot for large scale delivery of 
natural commodities for the China tea trade. 
II Problems of Explanation : Trade and Commodities 
I now want to shift the emphasis from models and concepts to the entangled objects themselves-
commodities - that were physically present, whenever two or more cultures and economies with 
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their respective institutions and underlying organisations edged up against one another, in this 
'borderless world' or Zone that the late eighteenth century world capitalist economy created. The 
inter-connectedness of these commodities: tea, opium, textiles and firearms, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, tripang, birds nest and pearls, illuminates how the structure and function of money, 
markets, and cross cultural trade, and a repertoire of practices in contemporary life were deter-
mined by their continuous negotiation within this 'borderless world'. 
Critical regional transitions began in the late eighteenth century with Britain's involvement in 
the intra-Asian trade. British merchants in the search for wealth bartered arms, textiles, opium 
and specie for an enormous variety of local commodities to balance the economic drain of their 
China trade. As British power increased in the late eighteenth century, trading settlements and 
outposts along the coasts of Southeast Asia developed rapidly, and along with places like Penang 
and Balambangan came the unfolding of the China trade and the search for profitable commodities 
[Warren 1977 : 73-93]. This quest for tripang, birds nest, pearls and other desirable commodities 
was to have a profound impact upon the various peoples of the Zone and their way of life and much 
of the rest of the eastern archipelago, constituting one of the most dramatic and fascinating epi-
sodes in the history of China's tea trade and the world capitalist economy. 
By 1700, tea had become, along with coffee and cocoa, one of the 'great non-alcoholic drinks' 
for all those Europeans with a sound grasp of epidemiological principles and fear of water borne 
diseases and pestilence. Within a century, the English, rightly reluctant to go beyond the bounds 
of epidemiological common sense, were each consuming 2.1/2 pounds of tea and 17 pounds of 
sugar [Hobhouse 1992: 115]. The right lessons and examples from history about global eco-
nomic-cultural inter-connections and inter-dependencies tend to explain patterns and events which 
have been formally glossed over. For example, sugar 'demanded' slaves and the Atlantic slave 
trade. Similarly, tea, inextricably bound to sugar as product and fate, would also inadvertently 
'demand' slaves in the Sulu Zone and the advent of Iranunan and Balangingi slave raiding. Since 
the British primarily wanted sea cucumber, sharks fin, pearls and birds nest for the trade in China 
tea, the issue of the nature of productive relations in Sulu or slavery suddenly became primary; the 
demand for local commodities in return for imports affected the allocation of labour power and the 
demand for people throughout the Zone. In this globalising context, tea was more than simply the 
major commodity in the development of trade between China and Britain, it was also a plant that 
was instrumental in the rise and transformation of the Sulu Sultanate as a regional power, perma-
nently influencing the economic organisation and integration of the Zone. 
Nor did the impact of the insatiable demand for the commodity tea end there with the stunning 
systemic development of trade, power and demography in the Sulu Zone, which changed the re-
gional face and history of insular Southeast Asia. The East India Company which had established 
a near global sector monopoly in China tea was restricted for the proper conduct of business to a 
small enclave at Canton. By 1820, it is estimated that probably 30 million pounds of the Company 
tea was consumed in Britain alone [ibid. : 96]. What was the cost of this mildly addictive non-
alcoholic beverage, drunk throughout the British Isles and re-exported all over the world, to Lon-
don trading houses? In 1801, at retail, tea cost importers about two million pounds in China. Or, 
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as Hobhouse puts it "an extraordinary sum of money (equivalent to about a billion dollars a year in 
todays value)" [ibid. : 115] had to be found annually by the factors and supercargos who traded in 
Canton. China at this time furnishes us with a fascinating and instructive account of a civilization 
seemingly self sufficient in technology, minerals, textiles and most other necessities of life. A 
necessary commodity, all this China tea arriving in Europe had to be paid for in specie. Dermigny 
describes the flow of silver to Canton and the East as a 'chronic haemorrhage' [Dermigny 1964 : 
724]. Despite the English selling on average 27 million pounds of raw indian cotton and textiles 
between 1785 and 1833, they still could not obtain enough capital to purchase all the tea Europe 
demanded [Wolf 1982 : 257]. After 1768, however, a partial financial answer had been found by 
British traders handling a variety of local commodities collected from the forests and fisheries of 
the Sulu Zone. But the definitive devastating answer and financial prayer to the amount of silver 
flowing into China was an ultra-addictive drug from India- opium. The exchange of opium for 
tea accelerated the disintegration of China at the very same time that it contributed to Sulu's ascen-
dancy. However, this commodity ultimately also sowed discontent among an increasing number 
of addicted Taosug coastal chiefs which culminated in a manifest loss of will on the part of key 
individuals in the 'chiefly' class as the Spanish swept out of the Visayas into the Mindanao-Sulu 
region with steamboat gunships, after 1848. No longer complete masters of either themselves or 
the seas, these datus now willingly collaborated with their arch political rivals and enemies - the 
Spanish - against the so-called 'pirates' and 'ruthless people' -the Samal Balangingi- in order 
to retain control over 'redistribution' in the Zone [Cojuangco 1993; Warren 1981: 104-125]. 
My emphasis here, as we follow various entangled objects with their readily defined character-
istics of 'modem' and singular 'magicalities and enchantments'[Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 6] 
from Europe and India to the Sulu Zone and China and back, is on the complicated role commodi-
ties of the world capitalist economy played in creating and breaking down the 'borders' of cultures 
across Eastern Asia-cultures, usually regarded as non-capitalist and 'traditional'. Ample evidence 
of the expanding stock of commodities, especially textiles and clothing, signifying progress and 
modernity, that also were part of the traffic of the tea-silver-opium syndrome, can be found in the 
British East India Company and Spanish trade data for the Sulu Sultanate, and arranged in series 
over time [Warren 1981: 259-263, 265-280]. 
The importance of the hand loom weaving industry in the regional economy of the Zone has 
been understated in various historical studies. The significance of the 'industry' in Basilan and 
Mindanao was evident in its role in providing a basis for local reciprocity and exchange, a source of 
trade and export revenue on an intra-regional basis, and more crucially, a form of entrenched com-
modity production. While the art of weaving was well developed among interior tribes of the Zone 
this was not the case among coastal people and traders at the end of the eighteenth century. Both 
the Chinese and Europeans quickly learned that the Taosug were highly skilled in working metal, 
leather and wood. But since they lacked textiles these soon became a staple commodity of the 
inter-regional trade. Cotton cloth from China, India and America were imported in many forms : 
primarily in bolts, and finished into sarongs, skirts, shawls, jackets, trousers, pants, handkerchiefs 
and ribbons. This imported cotton cloth was often better for ordinary clothing than indigenous-
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made cloth because it was lightweight, easier to sew, fashionable, and washable. Textiles, particu-
larly Indian cottons, rapidly became one of the most important trade commodities [ibid.: 49-50]. 
Hand loom manufactured textiles became insignificant by the 1840s in the redistributive economy 
of the Zone as commercial materials replaced the local woven cloth. Here again, to understand 
the relative decline and/ or absence of this traditional local handicraft industry in the life of the Zone 
we must focus attention on interdependent inter-regional developments affecting the China tea trade 
on a global-wide basis. Commercial textiles as commodities changed traditional productive proc-
esses such as hand loom weaving, altered peoples sense of fashion, domesticated their bodies, and 
fostered a deep seated material dependency that bound local consumers in the Zone to the interven-
tions of an expanding world capitalist economy, as flows of 'modern' objects intensified in speed and 
volume. Ironically, neither the contemporary 'modern' society that was being forged within the 
Zone nor the Taosug datus themselves were the complete masters of its fate. This history of com-
modities crossing and transforming regional boundaries must also concern itself especially with 
the politics of value: the phenomena of the power and meaning ascribed to these objects by both 
harbingers of these cross-cultural trade encounters, the heads of British tea firms and importing 
houses, and, the protagonists on the spot, the hongs of Canton and the peoples of the Zone, caught 
up in this hemispheric drama. 
Finally, the acquisition of 'powerful' new commodities, most particularly evident in the form of 
advanced gunpowder weapons led to quite dramatic changes in the possibilities for future preda-
tory development and decline in the case of the Sulu Sultanate and its rival neighbours after 
1768. To meet the increased demands for labour power in the Sulu Zone between 1768 and 1848, 
Taosug datus equipped Iranun and Samal slave raiding vessels and also provided credit advances in 
powder and ball, cannon, muskets, opium and additional crew. The spread of the European arms 
trade in conjunction with the China tea trade and its centralisation and regulation by the Taosug 
was particularly critical, since the political careers of these 'chiefs' on the coast as skillful traders 
and, ultimately, the very survival of the state depended on their monopolising the purchase of Euro-
pean war stores. The datus economic role as redistributors of these commodities - arms, pow-
der and lead -was vitally essential to the maintenance of their political hegemony in the Zone, and 
for understanding the inseparable link between a trade commodity and the meaning of force in a 
world in transition. 
1. Exotica : Tripang and Birds Nest 
The emphasis thus far has been on commodities, the constitution of culture and the economic, 
social, fiscal and environmental ramifications of linking China's and Sulu's traditional economies to 
the global market. I now want to take two commodities found in the zone - tripang and birds 
nest - to give an even better idea of how Chinese need, or greed for these products, changed the 
face of the ecological history of the Zone and shaped the destinies of hundreds of thousands of 
Southeast Asians, at a time of radical global economic transformation. In order to understand how 
these commodities altered the course of cross-cultural trade and historical events it is necessary 
momentarily to switch the location of interdependent economic sites; we must leave behind the 
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boardrooms of London's tea importers and China's urban coastal enclaves, for an encounter with 
the banquet halls of the Emperor of China, and the fisheries and forests of the Sulu Zone. 
Food has always been a major aspect of Chinese culture. In terms of ideals and forms of 
cultural expression, variety of foods, rituals and institutions few people except, perhaps, the French 
derive as much pleasure from eating at their dinner table, as the Chinese [Chang 1977 ; Lai 1984]. 
During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) a first class imperial banquet served by the emperor or em-
press would offer 34 varieties of meat, fish and fruit, a second class banquet 31 varieties, and a third 
class banquet 26 [Lai 1984 : 42]. Many types of exotic foods or commodities from the South Sea 
Islands are mentioned as standard fare of Chinese Imperial cuisine by mid eighteenth century. 
Particular cooking styles and special foods such as sea cucumber and birds nest seem to have made 
a considerable impact on the tastes, variety of dishes and extravagance of Manchu court life, by 
then {ibid.: 6]. Lai in a brief work illustrates the effects of texture and other factors, notably visual 
harmony on the Chinese palate, and thereafter furnishes us with an instructive history of how the 
Chinese went to great lengths to prepare certain dishes more for decorative or medicinal purposes 
rather than consumption. He demonstrates from the accounts of literary persons, food connois-
seurs and critics of the time how the burgeoning demand for a number of these exotic commodities 
can be explained by the term bu, foods rich in high quality protein, which were also said to possess 
the essence of the sheer vitality of life, or aphrodisiac powers [ibid. : 11]. 
The burgeoning trade in 'exotica' for Chinese cuisine and medicine led the Sulu Sultanate to 
begin to specialise in the production and collection of particular commodities in exchange for other 
commodities from Europe and China, especially textiles, opium and firearms. However, a factor of 
particularly striking importance here is how the Chinese table became a critical meeting point of 
the paradoxical dilemmas and contradictions generated by global market transactions, especially 
the intense demand for China tea in the farthest extremities of Western Europe. To pay for the 
tea, tripang or sea cucumber, super-abundant throughout the Zone, began to flow in huge quantities 
towards South China.8l Tripangor beche de mer Oiterally 'sea slug') is a tasteless substance. The 
dried or pre-soaked body of this edible holothurian, cooked in a rich chicken stock was generally 
valued for its texture as a food and as an aphrodisiac. This increase in the production of sea cu-
cumber due to new eating habits and styles of Chinese cooking had direct repercussions through-
out the Zone, where it highlighted the importance of the labour power of maritime nomadic fishers 
and slaves in the local regional economy and further altered the balance of power between seden-
tary coastal trading populations and these maritime nomadic 'masters' of the seas. 
The collection of tripang for the China tea trade demanded the exceptional diving skills of 
Samal boat dwellers. Certain Taosug communities linked to the Sultan and his kindred claimed 
the services of these local 'specialists' solely for the procurement of tripang and pearls. Dotting 
the gulfs, bays and reefs of the Sulu and Celebes seas were fleets of sailing vessels from Jolo and 
elsewhere which each year sailed to collect cargoes of tripang throughout the zone for the kitchens 
and banquet halls of Qing China. Diving trips, involving hundreds of small craft and lasting sev-
8) For another important contribution to the maritime and commercial history of the region centering on the 
tripang trade see MacKnight [1976) and Sopher [1965: 71-72, 123-127, 147-155, 239-243). 
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eral months at a time, were organised and led by these coastal Taosug datus. The collecting and 
processing of sea cucumber was exceptionally labour intensive. For most of the maritime popula-
tions of the Sulu Zone tripanging was a major activity of the global-local economy. But demand for 
labour in the tripang fisheries outstripped supply as China harvested mountains due to the rapid 
expansion of the tea trade in the early to mid nineteenth century. Direct archival evidence, and, 
my own observations and experience of living in a Samal Laut coastal village on the margin of the 
former Zone in the 1960s, enabled me to estimate the overall number of people involved in the 
tripang industry and their annual output at small establishments around the Zone. I suggested 
that the Taosug with their retainers and slaves normally collected around 10,000 piculs of tripang in 
any one season in the first half of the nineteenth century. This conservative estimate tends to 
support the conclusion that the collection of a picul of tripang required the average annual labour of 
two able bodied men. This means that in the first half of the nineteenth century an estimated 
68,000 men laboured each year in the Zone's tripang fisheries alone, to provide this popular Chinese 
exotica that was standard banquet fare and appeared on so many menus, sometimes braised with 
geese's feet or abalone [ibid. : 31]. 
One can hardly discuss Qing cuisine without mentioning birds nest. This exotic food seems 
to have come into favour slightly earlier than tripang. If the labour intensive economy of the Sulu 
Zone relied on the sea as an abundant source of tripang for the world capitalist economy, the wilder-
ness of Borneo was its second mainstay. It was principally from this environment that the Sultan-
ate was supplied with specialties for the China trade. Birds nest, collected primarily from lime-
stone caves were obtained in abundance by thousands of local specialists and slaves who initiated 
expansion of settlement and harvested the riches of the forests of east Borneo for their Sulu 
overlords. Birds nest is formed from the white saliva secreted from the mouths of tiny golden 
shrikes, a bird which abounds in east Borneo, to bind its nest to the walls of caves [ibid. : 30]. The 
nests were usually attached to the sides and roof in incredible quantities, and in seemingly inacces-
sible spots. These caves and shelters were often part of limestone cliffs over hundreds of feet 
high; for example, the mammoth Gomantan caves situated in the vicinity of the Kinabatangan river 
some two days journey from Sandakan Bay were part of a sheer cliff complex 900 feet high! The 
entrance to the largest limestone cave was over 100 feet wide by 250 feet high, and the roof sloped 
upwards 110 feet more, forming a magnificent natural cathedral some 360 feet in height. Soaring 
high above in the ceilings recesses were hundreds ofthousands of golden shrikes [Warren 1981: 
82]. The Taosug datus attempted to exercise direct authority over the collection of nests from 
particular cave sites. The nest gatherers in their thousands erected semi-permanent light stages, 
scaffolding and ladders of bamboo and cane everywhere, with which they pursued their hazardous 
occupation in the heart of the tropical forests of the Zone. Birds nest collecting in east Borneo 
lasted from February to June at which time Sulu prahus returned to Jolo in the midst of the inter-
regional trading season. The nests were harvested as soon as they had dried, either still full of 
feathers, or free of them. Traditionally, the nests from east Borneo sites were divided among the 
'cave owners', who collected them at great risk, the Taosug river lord, and the Sultan at the apex of 
the system of redistribution. 
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As noted earlier, throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the main competi-
tors of the Taosug in the birds nest trade were the Bugis on the Mahakam, and their successors on 
the Berau river. Even after the Taosug seized control of the major rivers at the southern extremity 
of the Zone, Bugis traders and their predatmy 'dayak' allies competed as fiercely with the Taosug 
over this commodity as their Samarinda based predecessors had done several decades earlier [ibid. : 
84-93]. The demand for this exotic food for the Chinese table led to a comparatively high inci-
dence of violence and warfare, performed by the same competing groups that organised and did the 
collecting. The evolution of the China tea trade also had a great deal to do with rapid commodity 
depletion and environmental degradation on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Both the reefs and 
forests of the Sulu Zone were 'open access' sites, where natural commodities such as tripang and 
birds nest were there for the taking. The Taosug and their rivals tended to over-collect, failing to 
conserve for the future in the heat of global-local competition and market demand. Unexpected 
fortunes and lack of environmental sustainability were a contemporary phenomena along with the 
theft and raiding of such sites. Faced with a range of changing global economic demands, and, 
Chinese food and eating habits, the Taosug and Bugis destroyed parts of the natural world of the 
Zone and abused its environment in exchange for other commodities - textiles, opium and war 
stores. In 1812, Hunt described the seasonal efforts of Taosug 'visitors' to exploit the birds nest 
caves of the Kinabatangan and its numerous tributaries: 
It is the practice of the industrious datus and chiefs to proceed to this place with all their slaves for the 
season; in which case they are sure to make great profits; formerly the birds' nests caves in this district 
were considered royalties, and the produce immense, at the present time they are plundered ad libitum 
and the quantity decreases every year. [Hunt 1967 : 54] 
Here, once again, we can trace the laser-like local-regional impact created by the intersections of 
the China tea trade in the world capitalist economy; the dramatic shock of Imperial China's cuisine 
on the fauna and people of the Zone, the associated violence. environmental degradation and other 
problems caused by the need to feed increasing numbers of affluent Chinese with extravagant tastes, 
and the changing pattern of labour power use with an inexorable growth of slavery and slave 
raiding. The unprecedented demand for these two entangled commodities- exotic natural 
foods -demonstrates the deep-seated range of problems the Sulu Zone faced and underlined the 
importance of the interdependent nature of the world-capitalist economy with both the environment 
and society of the Zone. 
III Trade and Society : Two Worlds 
I now want to analyse the relation between cores and zones or centers and peripheries in cultural 
rather than economic and political terms. I want to detail the impact of these entangled commodi-
ties upon the relationship between material culture and everyday life in the Zone. The boundaries 
between aspects of both Chinese and western culture and Malayo-Muslim culture, practice and 
belief were permeable in the late eighteenth century Zone. Indeed, Jolo was the site of repeated 
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complex cultural exchanges linked to the China tea trade that highlighted the ways cultural differ-
ence and diversity were increasingly blurred. For example, in the Sulu Zone of the early nine-
teenth century, high fashion on the Chinese model was predominant among datus in the capital, 
J olo, and in key trading centres. On the margins of the Zone, on the other hand, what prevailed 
was the Pasisir culture of Malayo-Muslim mariners, merged together with facets of a 'modernity' 
created by new commodities that signified global cultural interconnections and interdependencies, 
linking the Zone directly to the world capitalist economy. From trade documents, journals and 
illustrations left by traders and travellers we can learn more about how certain commodities bridged 
two worlds and in the process changed people's cultural attitudes and practices towards daily 
life. However, we must exercise extreme caution in the use of these source materials based on the 
privilege of partial perspective [Sears 1993 : 21]. Nevertheless, such sources can still provide sin-
gular insight to help establish the continuity of cultural similarities and differences with respect to 
the principles and practice of everyday life. The social-cultural traits and material culture of the 
Taosug and Samal were part of the constitution of a trading 'zone' that was rapidly changing both its 
form and content as it encountered the 'modem world'. A careful reading of such documents can 
reveal the level of economic integration achieved by Sulu and its Bomean dependencies in the 
wider global-regional network, the magnitude of change in material culture and lifeways that oc-
curred after 1768, and possible reasons for shifts in consumption patterns over time. 
The move from wearing sarongs to Chinese silk jackets and pants by Taosug datus, from local 
prints to Indian cottons by their Samal retainers, signifies the 'cultural texture' of an age, according 
to Samuel [Samuel 1989: 23]. The Comaroffs note in their discussion of the 'history' of a com-
modity and its impact on social and cultural life, that from the analysis of the career of valued every-
day goods, we can comprehend the evolution of complex social processes and individual intention 
and action [Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 14]. Ideas about fashion, work, property, value, class 
and authority all changed and were changed by the relation between particular commodities and 
'Zone' life. 
New commodities, material objects such as silk jackets, colourful handkerchiefs, cotton shorts, 
cutlery, porcelain, opium and guns, all came into widespread use at this time and, arguably, as 
instruments of 'modernity' or civilisation began to inaugurate local changes in the history of mate-
rial culture and the history of social behaviour at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For 
example, the history of the cultural interconnections between the China tea trade, textiles as a 
commodity and the history of the body in the Sulu Zone both as sites and objects of intercultural 
and symbolic contact is not supposed to be a new discovery. It is worth reminding ourselves that 
Dalrymple, Forrest and Hunt's pages on this particular aspect of cultural influence and the more 
general domain of the representation of the body and its political, historical and social consequences 
in the Zone were written between the 1760s and early 1800s [Dalrymple 1808 ; Forrest 1779]. The 
lack of any other garment except a coarse cotton loincloth was characteristic of the maritime popu-
lations of the Zone before the advent of the China tea trade, and some fishers frequently went 
naked. As late eighteenth century China increasingly opened up to foreign trade and investment, 
the long term historical experience documented here takes on renewed importance in the history 
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of the material culture of the Zone. It is of particular interest because shifts in the material reper-
toires for the clothing, representation and management of the body constitute important moments 
in the history of 'cultural' fashion, global-trade, and phenomenology of the human body. 
By 1812 the dress of a person in the Zone no longer was determined necessarily by their 
status. The poorest were still said to have gone about naked, some wore grass skirts, but it was far 
more common for an ordinary person or slave to have at least a Chinese jacket or sarong in coarse 
white cotton cloth. In 1834, Samal villagers at Siassi were described as being almost in a state of 
nudity, except for a nankin (cotton) skirt or a pair of loose trousers of the same fabric, cut off at the 
knees. The children were naked. Hunt had observed two decades earlier that coarse white and 
brown cotton cloth "was in universal wear among all classes." Some banyaga or slaves in the capi-
tal, however, managed to make their clothes out of imported silk and satin. At J olo it was difficult 
for Europeans to distinguish banyaga from Taosug because of this radical change in fashion 
behaviour linked to new material objects, such as the handkerchief: 
As a head dress, most of the Sulo men prefer the Publicat red handkerchief: a few only the fine Javanese 
handkerchief ... the middling classes and slaves are however partial to handkerchiefs of the most lively 
and shewy colours of the French and American patterns ... they also wear the China baju, full sleeves 
without buttons, either of rich gauzes, silk and sattens of all colours from China, or Europe and coast 
Chintzes of the largest and liveliest patterns; and some wear Manilla grass cloth. The lowest slave, in this 
respect, vies with the datu in splendour of apparel .... [Hunt 1967: 39] 
Most banyaga could expect to have their clothing provided by their masters: 
Through the influence of this woman I was bought the same day by her husband Unkud for a lilla the 
weight of one picul. Immediately I received from my new master a pair of trousers, a Chinese baju, a 
sarong and a handkerchief. [Pieters 1858: 310] 
Some people, like the coastal datu depicted in Marryt's travel account (see Photo 1), were 
clearly even more tied to several worlds. His costume is a flamboyant mixture: Chinese in style 
but also made up of material objects from Europe and the Malayo-Muslim world. Here fashion, as 
a statement, was an extrapolation of globalising social, political and economic forces. Social pat-
terns for the production, normalisation and manipulation of fashion were of central interest to my 
attempts to understand ways that the Taosug and other 'cultures' of the Zone produced specific 
forms of subjectivity and social organisation. 
For other more ordinary people these worlds were likely to meet in their families and things 
they made and used in their everyday life. For example, as I witnessed in 1967, a Samal Laut 
mother may have made a cradle strap for her new born child from a bolt of unravelled brown cotton 
cloth and sewed a pattern on it by hand with a new trade needle. The taoutan, boat cradle, would 
have been made with Chinese and European materials. Here too, material objects have been fash-
ioned together locally to bear witness to the flow of commodities and information between two or 
more worlds and across the generations. Acquisitive hardworking people around the Zone trans-
formed aspects of their way of life with these commodities that played a key role in Chinese and 
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Photo 1 A Taosug datu, dressed in high fashion, in the early 1840s, who controlled 
the redistributive trade of the Sulu Sultanate 
European efforts to dominate Sulu's intra-regional networks of trade and exchange. Cheap mass 
produced earthenware of every conceivable shape and size (cups, saucers, kettles, bowls, platters, 
dishes and basins) and exquisite porcelain along with metal utensils captured the markets and 
imagination of the Zone. 
Chinese potters had not only mastered singular glazing techniques but they proved more effi-
cient in mass producing crockery on a hitherto unprecedented scale than their regional competi-
tors or the Europeans themselves. The junks from Southeast China dominated the transport of 
these new material objects that were fast becoming essential to the maintenance of the pace of life 
in the Zone. 9) Cooking methods and utensils changed in the late eighteenth century. Fish that 
was formerly roasted on an open fire, or salted, was now boiled in iron or copper kettles and served 
with aromatic spices and rice in ornate earthenware basins and dishes. 
I have already discussed the sinister impact of opium as a trade commodity on the decisions 
9) For a list of the ceramic and earthenware that comprised the cargoes of Amoy junks circa 1776 and 1814 
see Appendix Bin Warren [1981: 259-260]. 
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and behaviour of key individuals and small groups of coastal datu that critically influenced the social 
development of the Zone during the 1840s and 50s. Here we must see the history of opium in Asia, 
as not simply a matter of a plant, an ephemeral material object, forging a global-political economy 
based on capitalism and addiction, but also as literally planting seeds of local change and 
destruction.10l One can only be stunned by the sudden ubiquity of opium in the history of Sulu. It 
seems that the drug touched many aspects of everyday life in the Zone as well as relentlessly alter-
ing the course of European and Chinese history. Apart from mapping out the rise and fall of the 
opium trade and measuring its magnitude in Sulu, one should also be able to document its impact 
on the social and cultural processes of the Zone, as the drug partially reshaped its political 
economy. A comprehensive view of opium, in the entangled history of the China tea trade and the 
Zone, needs to include the Asian mainland but specifically treat Sulu, where it was traded and con-
sumed, in order to understand the various manifestations and shifts between the representation 
and meaning of culture and power, on the one hand, and, on the other, the history of a commodity 
and the history of the body. 
Let me close this discussion about the history of the China tea trade, material culture, and 
cultural change by tracing the journey, albeit, briefly, of two commodities- a pearl and a steel 
knife - between the worlds of Europe and the Sulu Zone. The journey of the pearl began in the 
late 1700s; at the bottom of a reef, an expert Samal diver collected it for shipment back to Europe. 
The pearl was exchanged for a steel knife manufactured in Sheffield by a master smith. The Sulu 
pearl was sent back to London as a priceless commodity of the China trade to be crafted into a ring 
or necklace that became a symbol of royal authority and the European class system. The Sheffield 
knife brought by the English trader to Jolo did not at once change the Taosug and Samal's life as 
opium had done. Instead, this steel bladed weapon as a tool improved their artisan skills and 
fighting methods, as wood carvers, boatbuilders, and warriors. Things alien to their way of life 
and of little or no practical value were rarely exchanged or bought. The light weight dependable 
knife represented the highest quality merchandise Sheffield technology could produce. There 
was prestige involved in owning such a tool and its use became habit forming. However, the trade 
knife now served different needs than either the manufacturer or trader could have envisaged. The 
knife now became a Samal, not European, weapon on long distance maritime slave raids; one of 
many new material objects that was responsible for the expansion of Taosug power and culture 
throughout the region. In this context, the Sheffield knife became both a strikingly ironic symbol 
of the material ties between two worlds, and, the market driven forces of the world-capitalist 
economy. 
IV Society : Trade and Slave Raiding 
A cacophony of new sounds, sights, objects and tastes, along with an accelerated, materially ori-
ented life in the Sulu Zone created a new demand for slaves, by the early nineteenth century. The 
10) For a discussion of the impact of opium in an urban colonial context among labourers and prostitutes see 
Warren [1986: 240-249; 1993: 42, 46, 154, 293, 36~367]. see also Rush [1990] ; Trocki [1990]. 
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labour power demand was derived, based primarily on a European demand for tea, which Chinese 
peasants cultivated in the mountains of Fujian [Gardella 1994]. Hence, at the same time, there 
was also this interdependent parallel rising demand for slaves to work in the :fisheries and forests of 
the Sulu Zone. The demands of Europeans and Chinese for exotic commodities like sea cucum-
ber and birds nest increased slaving activity among certain groups in the Zone, who were lords of 
the sea and skillful warriors. To obtain more guns and ammunition, metal tools, textiles and opium 
for the Taosug, these maritime marauders had to obtain more and more slaves to collect and pro-
cess particular commodities to sell to the China tea traders. Thus, there was a rising demand for 
tea in Europe and a concomitant increase in regional-wide slave raiding in Southeast Asia. Taosug 
datus partially repattemed the life of particular maritime groups to meet the soaring European and 
Chinese demand, and to gain direct access to western technology and Chinese trade goods. 
The efforts of ambitious datus to participate in this burgeoning world-capitalist economy, with 
its extraordinary profits and markers of differential status and prestige, forced the demand for addi-
tional labour up and swelled the flow of global-regional trade. The need for a reliable source of 
labour power was met by the Iranun and Samal Balangingi, the slave raiders of the Sulu Zone. 
Photo 2 An Iranun sea warrior armed with a boarding spear and kampilan, or long sword 
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Indeed, the rapid growth of slave raiding was to keep pace with Sulu's global trade by providing the 
essential requisite for the continued growth of commodity collection and processing in the Zone -
labour power. One extraordinary feature of the interconnections between Sulu slave raiding and 
the advent of the world-capitalist economy was its rapid movement across the entire region as one 
Southeast Asian coastal population after another was hunted down. From the end of the eigh-
teenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, Southeast Asia felt the full force of the slave raiders 
of the Sulu Zone. Their harsh exploits were carried out on a large scale ; manning well-organized 
fleets of large, swift prahus, they navigated along the west coast of Borneo and crossed the South 
China Sea to the Straits of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. In the south, their raiding vessels 
thrust through the Makassar Strait and fanned out over the Indonesian world. They crossed the 
Banda sea to New Guinea, made raids along the coasts of Java, and circumnavigated Borneo. In 
pursuit of captives, Iranun and Balangingi terrorized the Philippine archipelago. They preyed on 
the poorly defended lowland coastal villages and towns of southern Luzon and the Visayan 
Islands. They even sailed and rowed their warships into Manila Bay, their annual cruises reaching 
the northern extremity of Luzon and beyond. They earned a reputation as daring, fierce maraud-
ers who jeopardized the maritime trade routes of Southeast Asia and dominated the capture and 
transport of slaves to the Sulu Sultanate [Warren 1981: 147-211]. Captive people, from across 
Southeast Asia in their tens of thousands, seized by these sea raiders were put to work in the Zone's 
fisheries, in the Sultan's birds' nest caves, or in the cultivation of rice and transport of goods to 
markets in the local redistributive network. Thus the Sulu state created and reproduced the mate-
rial and social conditions for the recruitment and exploitation of slaves in the Zone. More than 
anything else it was this source and use of labour power that was to give Sulu its distinctive preda-
tory character in the eyes of Europeans in the nineteenth century as a 'pirate and slave state'. 
Southeast China's tea trade and the global capitalist economy changed the pattern of maritime 
warfare and economic and social relationships among certain Zone populations, increasing its in-
tensity and scope across the region. It led to widespread decimation and displacement of entire 
populations throughout the Christian Philippines and much of the rest of Southeast Asia. Sulu 
was primarily an ascendant commercial state, standing at the centre of a widely spread redistribu-
tive economy. But it was under Taosug sponsorship and in the service of that interdependent 
global-regional economy that others raided throughout the Malay world. It is worth emphasizing 
again the powerful economic forces that were pushing the Taosug aristocracy in the direction of 
acquiring more and more slaves; in the first place, their demands for all kinds of products coming in 
from external trade had to be satisfied - demands that were constantly increasing. These de-
mands were both a consequence and cause of slavery. In order to trade, it was necessary for the 
Taosug to have something to give in exchange. Hence the collection and redistribution of pro-
duce was dominated by those datus with the largest number of slaves ; that is by the Sultan and 
certain datus on the coast who were most directly involved in Sulu's global trade. Secondly, the 
more dependent Sulu's economy was on the labour power of slaves, the larger loomed the question 
of its supply of slaves. The only way for the Taosug to obtain the commodities which formed the 
basis of their commerce was to secure more slaves, by means oflong-distance raiding. In the early 
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nineteenth century the rate of growth of the Sultanate's population had not kept pace with its ex-
panding international trade economy. Since it was the labour of slaves that made possible global-
regional trade, slavery rose markedly from this time and became the dominant mode of production. 
This also explains why J olo quickly became the principal centre in the Zone for the importation of 
slaves and the outfitting of marauders. 
Thus, the cross-cultural combination of Chinese tea and the latest European firearms as com-
modities, within the context of expanding inter-regional trade and improved maritime military 
organisation, set the stage for the explosive emergence of key marauding populations in the space 
of just several decades. Moreover these mobile raiding populations took it upon themselves to 
'modernise' and acquire foreign technology, especially gunpowder arms, to rapidly strengthen their 
strike force and social organisation, as well as enhance their ship building techniques and nautical 
skills. Indeed the post 1780 era saw slave raiding more widespread and intense than at any earlier 
time as the Iranun and Balangingi borrowed both knowledge and technology from European and 
Chinese traders; Chinese compasses, European mariner's charts and brass telescopes were all 
widely used to great advantage as 'weapons of war' by these sea raiders. 
I have noted earlier that the control and possession of firearms by Taosug on the coast pro-
foundly altered ethnic inter-relations, the local-regional balance of power, and accelerated the for-
mation of the 'Zone' at the expense of neighbouring polities. The English, to protect their financial 
interests in China, distributed firearms and gunpowder on a large scale to the coastal chiefs, who 
controlled the redistributive trade of the Zone. The early acquisition of cannon, gunpowder, flint-
lock rifles and shot from European China traders in return for exotic commodities led to increased 
traffic in slaves, warfare, and, at the same time, ever rising levels of arms imports into Sulu after the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century [ibid. : 48-49]. The supply of firearms to the Zone escalated 
dramatically in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. New England yankee traders and whal-
ers from the northeastern seaboard of the United States sold arms freely to the Taosug and Samal, 
giving them a forceful advantage over this particular channel of trade at the expense of coastal rivals 
and interior tribal groups in the Zone, and much of the rest of Southeast Asia. The datus quickly 
recognised that large scale possession of western firearms enhanced their prestige and consoli-
dated their position and power in the redistributive economy of the Zone. 
The Taosug demanded the highest quality firearms and weapons. To satisfy them, traders 
and manufacturers searched for better weapons and ways to custom produce them on consign-
ment English industrial technology in Sheffield, Birmingham and Manchester developed beauti-
ful, dependable Kris, and firearms. Inexpensive British manufactured muzzle loading flintlock 
rifles and other arms imports led to the reframing of Southeast Asian political boundaries, espe-
cially in the area of the Zone and eastern Indonesia. The Taosug could sustain organised maritime 
military power on a large scale and consolidate control over trade for an extended time because of 
the strength and discipline derived from the improved guns and industrial technology of Europe; 
firearms that would threaten the social order and stability of much of Southeast Asia when placed in 
the capable hands of the Iranun and Balangingi. Huge quantities of lead were shipped into the 
Sulu Zone in the form of shot, musket balls and unworked blocks. Gunpowder, which had been 
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discovered in China as a propellant and explosive for wartime use and moved to Europe as a weapon 
of war, was brought in huge quantities to Sulu by European China traders. By the early 1830s, 
Gamaliel Ward, captain of the brig Leonidas, revealed the extent to which the arms trade had been 
expanded atJolo since Dalrymple's time in the 1760s. A leading datus firearm's request included: 
"1,000 25-pound kegs of gunpowder, 6 swivel guns, 6 large cannon preferably brass, 600 muskets, 
100 pistols, 4 bags of shot of varying sizes, gun flints, 2 dozen boxes of percussion caps and 8 dozen 
matchlets."11J By 1835, gunpowder and muskets were the principal trade commodities desired by 
coastal intermediaries. These figures must be considered as only a small estimate of the volume 
of war stores furnished at Sulu's market- the tip of the iceberg, because large quantities of gun-
powder and firearms also reached the Taosug as a consequence of Bugis enterprise. 
Demand from China tea traders for exotic commodities, introduction of firearms by them, and 
intensified slave raiding led to major changes in Samal Laut social organisation and ecological 
adaptation. Slave raiding, warfare and boat building became increasingly important activities for 
these traditional fishers as the Taosug became more involved in the China tea trade, and ever more 
-- Raidmgltacl< 
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Fig. 2 Slave Raiding in South East Asia 
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11) 'Goods for Sooloo Market', Ms Peabody Museum see Warren [1981: 50-53]. Figures are lacking for the 
earlier period, but the value for the gunpowder alone which is in excess of the total worth of Dalrymple's 
order, shows expansion. 
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dependent upon it for commodity exchange. The Iranun and Samal Balangingi armed with the 
latest firearms struck fear into the hearts of coastal and riverine people throughout Southeast Asia; 
local populace were soon afraid to live along unprotected stretches of the seacoast or come down to 
the ocean front from the interior. The regularity of these raiding sweeps for slaves were as pre-
dictable as the winds which carried the Iranun and Samal Balangingi boats to their target 
areas. Customary warnings were issued each year by the Dutch, Spanish and English to coastal 
towns and small craft on the approach of the 'pirate wind' in August, September and October that 
brought these lords of the eastern seas and fishers of men to the straits of Malacca. Scattered 
along the coastline of the Philippine Archipelago one is still able to find - sometimes with some 
difficulty- the remnants of the 100 year long terrifying presence of these raiders- an old stone 
watchtower, a crumbling church cum garrison, or the remains of a Spanish fort and cemetery ; 
decaying monuments to the export of tripang and birds nest and a host of other commodities and 
the import of firearms from the Euro/ American core and some Chinese goods. The remains of 
such neglected sites, primarily concentrated along the coasts of Catanduanes, Albay, Leyte and 
Samar, bear silent witness to the advent of sudden affluence in the Zone and deep despair through-
out the Philippines [ibid.: 174-181, 237-245]. 
The formation and prosperity of the Sulu Zone, as this account of the interdependent relation-
ship between particular commodities and its economic and cultural history indicates, was based 
above all else on slaves. It was the role of the Sulu state, within its large trading Zone, to maintain 
the material and social conditions for the recruitment and exploitation of slaves. Equally impor-
tant, the political and commercial growth of the Sulu Zone was reflected in the enormous increase 
in war stores in the Jolo market at the beginning of the nineteenth century -lead, iron, shot, gun-
powder and cannon. The Taosug aimed at monopolizing control over the exchange and distribu-
tion of these goods which, with slaves, enabled the reproduction of the social formation; the Euro-
pean firearms supplied by global-regional trade enabled coastal dwelling Taosug to advance their 
commercial interests in the inter-societal network, promote raiding on a large scale and keep the 
Zone free of undesirable intruders and competitors. As Terray emphasizes, it is only in this sense 
that external trade is a vital element in the overall functioning of the social formation: "like every 
distributive mechanism, it created no wealth that was born in the process of production; but it gave 
a concrete form appropriate to the requirements of reproduction" [Terray 197 4 : 335-336]. The 
Sulu state was geared to continuous acquisition of slaves and slave raiding as a consequence of the 
intersections between the China tea trade and the world capitalist economy. The problem for the 
Taosug by the mid 1850s was that this kind of preying on peripheral communities could not be 
sustained any longer and the frontier(s) of the Zone expanded indefinitely. When long-distance 
slave-raiding and warfare declined, the Taosug economic and political system began to slowly disin-
tegrate and even aspects of the social structure began to change, along with the shape and charac-
ter of the Zone. 
1. Society : Globalisation and Slavery 
Slaves were reported by travellers, traders and emissaries to be engaged in every conceivable do-
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mestic, agricultural and industrial occupation in the Sulu Zone. As Taosug trade became inter-
locked with the world capitalist economy, and the economic and political problems posed by the 
China tea trade and imperialism grew, so did the amount of work which required literacy and stra-
tegic knowledge of local regional affairs. Paradoxically, few Taosug aristocrats could either read 
or write in any of the languages pushing into the Zone and banyaga with education who could serve 
as scribes, translators, and language tutors were much sought after [Warren 1981: 222-228]. The 
rate of upward social mobility for banyaga in early nineteenth century Sulu was higher than that in 
the early nineteenth century Christian Philippines or other parts of colonial Southeast Asia. In 
Jolo and elsewhere, slaves could have family roles as husband or wife, they could own property, 
including other slaves, and often filled a variety of political and economic roles- as bureaucrats, 
interpreters, warriors, and farmers, as concubines and traders - by virtue of which they were en-
titled to certain rights and privileges accorded to other members of the dominant society. 
A banyaga could purchase his freedom in the Sulu Zone. This was frequently the case among 
those banyaga who had an aptitude for trade. The likelihood of manumission was essentially a 
function of occupation. Banyaga who provided immediate and indispensable services to their 
masters, who served in their households or on their trading vessels, had better chances of manu-
mission than those who laboured in the forests or fisheries. Their owners often found it best to 
allow such slaves to acquire property so as to encourage initiative and establish their loyalty. 
Certain segments of the maritime-military and local administrative elites in the Zone were recruited 
from the Christian slave population. Adolescents selected on the basis of their abilities were given 
a thorough education by their Taosug masters and required to tum Muslim. Conversion to the 
dominant religion of the Zone cut these slaves off from their cultural roots, making them ever more 
dependent on the Sultan [ibid. : 228-229]. 
'Slavery' in this sense was a means of incorporating people into the social and economic system 
of the Zone. I have argued elsewhere that 'open' systems of slavery, such as the Sulu Sultanates, 
were those which acquired labour through capture or purchase of slaves, and assimilated them as 
'insiders' into the dominant group. The most recently acquired slaves were those most clearly 
demarcated from other dependent groups and the wider society. But within the first generation, 
those individuals most likely to be incorporated in an 'open' system were female slaves, in terms of 
the relative importance of productive and reproductive activities, adolescents, and children 
[Warren 1997]. Banyaga were strategically enrolled in the following of datus for political and eco-
nomic support, but far more than anything else they were needed to labour in the forests and fisher-
ies to maintain an expansive redistributional economy and the flow of global-regional trade. They 
were predominately Visayan, Tagolog, Minahassan and Buginese speakers, although almost every 
major ethnic group of insular Southeast Asia was to be found among their ranks. Some inherited 
their status. Others were obtained in fulfilment of debt obligations. But all banyaga or their an-
cestors had been seized by professional slave raiders and retailed in communities throughout the 
Zone. 
While the Sulu Sultanate had for several centuries been integrated into the political and eco-
nomic trade system of China, British expansion in Eastern Asia after the 1760s drew the emerging 
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state into a systemic network of economic traffic on a global scale. The rising demand for south-
east Asian slaves reshaped the character of the political economies of Sulu and China, and, as part of 
the same process, gave birth to the Zone and the advent of highly mobile specialised communities 
of slavers. Thus the history of the slave trade and the rise of the Iranun and Balangingi must be 
framed as part of a unitary historical process, which emphasizes the intrusive role played in their 
sudden development and expansion by the global capitalist economy and singular commodities 
such as tea, birds nest and firearms. Slave raiding, or what the Spanish, Dutch and British called 
piracy, was not a manifestation of decay and dependence but rather the result of phenomenal eco-
nomic growth and strength. It was part of a vital effort to partake in and control a rapidly increas-
ing volume of cross-cultural commerce caused by the arrival of Europeans in the China tea trade in 
the late eighteenth century. Accusations of cultural decadence and barbarism directed against 
Sulu by the leading European participants in that trade are both ironic and erroneous when ap-
proached from the perspective of a unitary historical process. The Sulu Sultanate was able to 
marshall its resources in the direction of slave raiding when the new circumstances of the China tea 
trade suddenly made collecting and processing of exotic commodities so profitable in the Zone. 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the place of the slave and slave 
hunting in the economy and society of the Sulu Zone. The first is the decisive importance of the 
exploitation of slaves in the functioning of the social formation in the Zone: "A social formation 
cannot be understood except by beginning with an analysis of the relations of production which are 
at its base" [Terray 1974: 340]. Global-regional trade spawned slavery in the Sulu Zone. The 
enormous increase in external trade which affected state formation and economic integration made 
it necessary to import captives from outside the Zone to bolster the work force population. As 
commodities from China, Europe and North America flowed to J olo, the Taosug aristocrats thrived, 
and the Iranun and Balangingi, strong, skilled maritime people who were the scourge of Southeast 
Asia, raiding in 90 foot long prahu, emerged. The sea and tropical forests were the life force of the 
Sultanate, where tens of thousands of banyaga laboured annually to provide the exotic specialties 
for the China trade. Secondly, the arrival of captive slaves on a hitherto unprecedented scale for 
intensive labour or skilled work and their gradual 'disappearance' through incorporation into the 
lower levels ofTaosug and Samal society was central to the development and the expansion of Sulu 
culture and the redistributive system. 
By arguing for a broader global economic perspective interesting complex questions are raised 
about what constitutes our conception of 'culture'. While thousands of captive people were allo-
cated throughout the Zone each year as slaves in the period under consideration, the borderlines of 
race, 'culture', and ethnicity were increasingly blurred by the practise of incorporation and 
pluralism. I maintain in The Sulu Zone that the Taosug and Samal not only lived in an increasingly 
interdependent world but that they lived in an emergent multi-ethnic society, the multicultural in-
habitants of which came from many parts of Eastern Asia and elsewhere in the world. How are 
identities - single or multiple - forged? What symbols, rituals and perceptions create a strong 
sense of collective identity? The traditional assumption of a 'culture' as enduring over time despite 
outward changes in people's lives and value orientations is both "empirically misleading and deeply 
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essentialist" [Keesing 1991 : 46]. As Roger Keesing noted, there is no part of Eastern Asia where 
both the production and reproduction of 'culture' and cultural meaning can be characterised as 
unproblematic, without glossing over or disguising radical changes in relation to ethnicity, power 
and hierarchy that have differentially affected states like Sulu and urban-rural settings like the Zone 
[ibid.]. In terms of not exaggerating the boundedness, discreteness and homogeneity of a way of 
life taking shape in the Zone at the end of the eighteenth century, the power of language, memory 
and commodities as symbols in the construction of new identities and communities was increas-
ingly recognised, by myself. 
Filling a conspicuous gap in the literature this aspect of my ethnohistorical research explored 
the reinventing of ethnicity in light of tightening ties to the global-capitalist economy and the wider 
world of darul Islam. The question of the conditions under which these new identities were formed, 
and ethnicity accomplished, creating a semblance of cultural homogeneity throughout the Zone, 
especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, has aroused considerable subsequent interest. 
I stressed in The Sulu Zone the inextricable relationship between slave raiding, forced migration, 
'homeland' and identity as being critical factors that led to the emergence of new communities and 
diasporas. 
The expression of 'ethnicity' was suddenly recognised to be bound up with the accelerating 
process of global-regional trade, especially in the classical case of the Samal Balangingi. The only 
historical work which deals with the Balangingi does not consider their ethnic origins [Tarling 
1963 : 146-185]. Avoidance of this question presents a deceptive picture of a static 'society' with a 
homogeneous population. Samal groups in the Sulu archipelago were emergent populations; the 
success of the Balangingi as slave raiders was due in large measure to their ethnic 
heterogeneity. Captives' statements present a picture of Samal populations undergoing constant 
readjustments until 1848. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was an infusion of 
ethnically diverse captive people among the Balangingi - mostly through demands for their labour 
on raiding prahus and in the tripang and pearl fisheries - that complicated the identity of the Samal 
populations. 
Many of the captives or slaves who were brought to Balangingi turned Samal- borrowing 
language, religion, and customs. Insufficient data prevents a precise reconstruction of the overall 
size and origin of Samal populations at that time. What information there is for the nineteenth 
century has survived in the statements of fugitive captives; these show that the incorporation of 
foreign elements took place on a large scale, especially the second and third generation. In 1836 it 
was estimated that only one tenth of the male population were 'true' Balangingi Samal; the remain-
der were renegados (renegades), more particularly Visayan and Tagalog or other captives [Warren 
1978: 477-490]. The Taosug economy was expanding rapidly enough at this time for Samal popu-
lations to absorb larger and larger numbers of captives. An apparently conscious recruitment policy 
of the datus changed the numerical structure and ethnic composition of Samal groupings in less 
than two generations (1820-48). Barth considers a ten per cent rate of incorporation in a genera-
tion drastic [Barth 1969 : 22]. By those standards, the flexibility of the system was incredible. 
Village populations in 1836 appear to have risen from just over 300 people with 10-12 raiding prahus 
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(garay) at Tunkil to more than a thousand people, with 30-40 prahus, at Balangingi. In less than a 
decade, Balangingi's population roughly quadrupled; in 1845 the village had an estimated 4,000 
people and 120-150 large vessels. The overall Samal population devoted to slave raiding reached 
an upper limit in 1848, of 10,000 people with 200 raiding prahus. The consequences of extraordi-
nary growth was the creation of an 'emergent' slave-raiding population within the Sulu Sultanate -
the Samal Balangingi. 
Central to my approach about demographic expansion and the advent of a vast number of 
newer societies in the Sulu Zone was the notion that 'cultures' are dynamic rather than static. 
Migratory rythmns and population patterns depended significantly on the dynamics of international 
trade. A population explosion took place in the first half of the nineteenth century, followed by 
pioneering expansion and settlement on the margins of the Zone, the exploitation of the wilderness 
and marine gardens, rising market incentives, and a victory for the Taosug entrepreneurs at the 
expense of their arch rivals, living from the profit of trade and redistribution. While this model of 
change is fundamentally economic, ecological and demographic, there is a central place in it for 
exploring the relationship between these critical factors and the historically specific social and eco-
nomic contexts in which 'culture' is constituted and reinvented across regional dividing lines. 
Tens of thousands of people were not only members of an emergent trading zone; they were 
also members of an expansive multi-ethnic state where two or more cultures regularly existed side 
by side and, undoubtedly, clashed with one another at times. The Taosug worked hard to protect 
certain aspects of the overall integrity of their original culture in the face of the demographic explo-
sion and material onslaught but the (im)possibilities of living with difference raged everywhere in 
the Zone. As they became ever more thoroughly enmeshed in the world capitalist system, banyaga 
Photo 3 A Garay, Balangigi slave raiding vessel, under full sail 
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and other socially subordinate populations internalised the differential cultural norms and forma-
tive ideals of the coastal elites. Banyaga were encouraged to adopt Islam and marry. Some slaves 
who thoroughly accepted the dominant culture were permitted to purchase their freedom. Manu-
mission was commonly practised and freed slaves were merged into the general population, assum-
ing a new ethnicity and status. For banyaga, conversion and marriage were prerequisites to manu-
mission. This expedient reinvention of ethnicity resulting from the interconnected force of cir-
cumstance generated by the China tea trade compels us to think about related notions of society 
and 'culture' in more processual ways [Wolf 1982 : 387]. Historians of the region need to locate 
the emergence, maintenance and abrogation of populations and the 'cultures' they encompass within 
the framework of a series of historically changing, imperfectly bounded, multiple and branching 
integrated sets of local, regional and global social and economic alignments. This case based dis-
cussion of the concept of Asian 'cultures' as problematic, and the crucial factors which gave rise, in 
one common process, to the accomplishment of ethnicity in the Sulu Zone provides the basic build-
ing blocks for future comparative and theoretical analysis. 
V On Sources and Methodology 
The challenge facing the ethnohistorian of modern Southeast Asia is to locate the right combination 
of sources to establish a more comprehensive interpretation of the place of 'societal' development in 
the global economy; a macro system that itself was 'developing' but whose social, political and 
economic structures or segments and alignments did not necessarily follow parallel paths across 
time. In many respects, these sources, that can create a global political economy framework to 
provide a view of the world as a complex rapidly changing macro system, while still affirming that 
the evolution of various parts or 'societies' cannot be understood without studying micro-social 
change within its global-local context, are extremely difficult to locate. This is especially the case 
when one pushes further back in time, and resurrects more peripheral non-western, pre-industrial 
networks and states, like the Sulu Sultanate, and attempts to link them to a hemispheric structural 
view of the whole over several centuries. 
A chronic problem facing ethnohistorians of Asia, Africa and Latin America is the uneven na-
ture of the source material available for certain people, places and times. How can one provide a 
well detailed historical reconstruction and measure change if the documents as 'instruments of 
measurement' are scarce, non-existent, or themselves changing? [Burke 1992 : 38-39]. The ef-
fort has to be made to bring to bear as wide a range of evidence as possible, on critically specific 
points, to emphasize the global interconnections and interdependencies of particular societies and 
regions, in order to fashion a holistic explanation of their mutual interactions and clashes in a con-
temporary 'borderless world', created by an evolving world capitalist economy. It was necessary 
to seek out as much evidence wherever it could be obtained because of the accidental generation 
and destruction of historical records concerning the ethnohistory of the Sulu Zone. I used an 
extremely varied, in fact eclectic, body of documentation from around the world to resolve the 
problem of the significance of the China tea trade for the transformation of Taosug society and 
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culture of the late eighteenth century: all forms of evidence - archeological, anthropological and 
historical. 
While the archeology of the Zone is comparatively poor solid anthropological fieldwork had 
been done over the course of several decades among the Taosug of J olo, the Samal Balangingi, the 
Samal Bajau Laut, and the Yakan of Basilan in the Sulu archipelago and northeast Borneo, and 
among the Maranao and the Subanun of Mindanao. Without the ethnographic materials that were 
published as a result of this fieldwork, it would have been difficult for me to assess the value of 
European historical source materials, especially the diaries and journals of explorers and traders 
like Dalrymple, Rennell, Forrest and Hunt with some important additions from the Spanish officers 
of the small neighbouring garrison settlement of Zamboango.12> There were ample sources for the 
study of the commercial marauding patterns of the Sulu Zone in the period 1768-1898, but they 
were scattered, still unrecognized, in several European archives, and in Manila and Jakarta. While 
much of the material in English on Sulu had been exploited, primary source material in Spanish and 
Dutch archives had yet to be systematically investigated. There remained then a need for exten-
sive archival research to present a coherent picture of Sulu's commercial position in a changing 
global-regional context from the mid-eighteenth to the late nineteenth century. 
I have drawn upon anthropological concepts, European documents in several languages with 
excerpts and examples from official reports, diaries, letters, journals and newspapers, and local 
accounts to examine the economic vitality of the Sulu Sultanate, in its role as an entrepot for Euro-
pean and Asian commerce in the China trade from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century. 
Among the most important sources I have used are the manuscripts in the archives of Spain (prin-
cipally the Archive of the Indies) on trade from Manila to the Sulu Sultanate between 1768 and 
1848. When compiled and ordered as a time series, these documents (particularly the estados and 
the almojarifazgo) suggest the overall level of commercial activity, shifts in market preferences, and 
the economic interdependence of Canton, Manila and J olo. The statistical analysis of these official 
trade 'series' were employed to show changes over time in the economic life and broader patterns of 
the zone's global-regional commerce. These Spanish sources were tailor made for my need to 
compile an economic 'serial history' (histoire serielle), showing the speed, volume and flows of com-
modities and people created through the regional intersections of the China tea trade, of which the 
pursuit of the slave trade across Southeast Asia was a sub-system of the broader economic pattern. 
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the population of Sulu was heterogeneous and 
changing- socially, economically, and ethnically. This was a direct result of global trade. The 
populating of the Sulu Zone by captives from the Philippines and various parts of the Malay world 
and their role in the redistributional economy centred atJ olo cannot be under-estimated. Previous 
historical studies of the Sultanate depended largely on published colonial records and accounts to 
understand the economic and social role played by slaves in the economy rather than on records 
12) Extensive ethnological research had been conducted among the Taosug by Thomas Kiefer; among the 
Balangingi Samal by William Geoghegan ; among the Samal of Cagayan de Sulu and Palawan by Eric 
Casino ; among the Samal Laut by Harry Nimmo, Clifford Sather and Carol Warren; among the Yakan by 
Carol Molony ; among the Maranao by David Barradas; and among the Subanun by Charles Frake. 
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produced by the slaves themselves. Slavery in Sulu was observed through the eyes and precon-
ceptions of European observers and writers who viewed Sulu as the centre of a world fundamentally 
hostile to their interests- an Islamic world whose activities centred about piracy and slavery. 
A unique alternative to this Eurocentric perspective is presented by the scattered statements of 
fugitive captives from the Sulu Sultanate. Carlo Ginsburg, a gifted Italian historian, whose classic 
works have challenged us to retrieve social worlds that more conventional history does not record, 
describes particular types of legal-juridicial documentation, as "written records of oral speech" 
[Ginsburg 1989: 156]. For instance, according to Ginsburg's methodology, the written proceed-
ings and statements of the fugitive slaves of the Sulu Zone could be considered comparable in 
certain respects to the notebooks of an anthropologist who studied a cultural system where vio-
lence and slavery were an everyday occurrence; or to put it another way, the Spanish naval officer as 
anthropologist, performing a type of 'fieldwork' in the Zone, centuries ago. All sorts of details of 
material life and social activities recorded in the official proceedings of these officers were often 
incidental to the main purpose of gathering naval intelligence on the strength and social organisation 
of the fiercely independent and intractable Sulu slave raiders, their communities, and the nature of 
material life and market transactions. Hence, the tangential information was not likely to have 
been distorted. It is precisely because this historical evidence could be used to tease out hidden 
information embedded in it to recapture the broader patterns, while also building up a picture of the 
lives of slaves across the Zone and their pivotal role in shaping that environment, that these testimo-
nies proved so invaluable. Sifting through the broad body of official statements of the cautivos 
fugados generated by Spanish and Dutch naval officers and merchant traders between 1836 and 
1862, documents most historians considered to have been among the archival 'curiosities' of a pi-
rate principality and 'clash of civilisations', it proved possible to construct a history from below; a 
stunningly different type of social history based on documents of seemingly little consequence. 
What the direct testimony of the fugitive captives contained was 'life' : a freshness and wealth 
of small scale detail that could be used to explore the mental and material world of several genera-
tions of slaves; an exceptionally rich source, containing singularly invaluable textured accounts 
around which to base on a cultural level case studies and a collective biography. I made extensive 
use of this neglected source of Southeast Asian social history to reconstruct the social organisation 
ofSulu slave raiding, slave life in the Zone and to make slave voices speak [Warren 1981 : 299-315]. 
The trade data and the statements of the fugitive slaves complement one another, and together 
enable us to resolve many fundamental questions about the magnitude of the Sulu Zone's global-
regional trade, its flourishing slave population, and how these changed over time as a consequence 
of the impact of the China tea trade and the world capitalist economy. 
The scarcity of particular types of sources to study the ethnohistory of the maritime people of 
Southeast Asia has encouraged the growth of new interdisciplinary historical techniques and 
methods. To discover the links between the experience of coastal Taosug datus, slave raiders and 
slaves and the larger events in their lives, I have depended on different branches of social 
enquiry. Ethnohistory and micro-history have been critical in showing how empirical research 
can be shaped and changed. This methodological approach to the ethnohistory of the Sulu Zone 
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and slavery has necessarily combined the broader concerns of economic and social transformation 
with tracing the experiences of these men and women's lives. By expanding both the spatial and 
temporal reach of analysis it was possible to provide an account of the typical career pattern of a 
coastal chief or Visayan slave and how they lived the 'big changes' in the Zone at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. An obvious result of this approach has been to clarify the process of moving 
the boundaries in historical methodology and thought, as the questions asked about the history of 
the Sulu Zone in my volume changed, and new expectations of the craft were imposed. 
This search for a way to link individuals and events to larger, impersonal systems is tenable at 
the intersections bridging the "narrative space of ethnography" [Marcus 1986: 190], the use of 
quantitative methods for the prosopographer, and the study in depth of the small scale. In this 
way, I adapted the methods of social anthropology and historical computing to 'do' ethnography in 
the archives, in order to understand the 'otherness' of a previous era and place, or as the French 
social historian, Robert Darnton, phrased it, to do "history in the ethnographic grain" [Darnton 
1985: 3]. This inquisitive and provocative methodology linking history and anthropology calls 
upon us to join culturally configured actions, nuances and contradictions in society and history to 
individuals and events by a variety of historiographical means. I isolated one critical approach -
prosopography. 
My key problem in focusing on the collective identity of particular social groups- slaves and 
Samal marauders - was to choose a sample which represented the total regional and social 
population(s) of the Zone. Spanish naval officers, specialists in 'contemporary Sulu affairs', inter-
rogated the fugitive slave informants, and more than a century and a half later, I used the methods 
of content analysis and analysed these interviews statistically to create a multi-sourced and inte-
grated data base as a prosopographer. The difficulties that attended an analysis of the social and 
ethnic complexity of the historical situations of the slaves and the Taosug and Samal Balangingi and 
the contradictions inherent in their lives - the exact combination of motives, pressures, values and 
feelings - perhaps, could only be depicted through a prosopography : a collective biography, rest-
ing on a scaffolding of empirically integrated fragments of life histories. This technique compelled 
me to pay close attention to the disparate experiences, values and motives of a relatively small 
group of slaves (180+) in diverse contexts and sequences of actions, in order to piece together in a 
convincing manner the pattern and meaning of their lives for the majority of slaves throughout the 
Sulu Zone. The social relationships between Taosug datus and slaves were shaped by the China 
tea trade, imperialism and the rapid growth of the world capitalist economy. In this context, the 
'collective biography' I constructed from statements made by the slaves who escaped, were res-
cued, or were ransomed, at one and the same time defined the slave 'community', explored its 
history, and presented with sensitivity and human interest the great variety of life experiences and 
fate of some of its women and men. By adopting these ethnohistorical methods it was possible to 
show not merely what the 'faceless masses', little people who often have left few documentary traces 
of their lives or careers, thought, but why they thought it, and acted, accordingly. 
In my examination of historical perspective in the Sulu Zone a primary concern was 'angle of 
vision' or how one views a particular event, phenomena or individual(s) [Sears 1993: 6--7, 298]. 
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What is the consequence for the conventional practice of history of looking at events and actions 
from other subject positions, that of slaves, for example? I immediately became aware of the po-
tential offered by the testimony of the fugitive slaves for exploring new subject positions and per-
spectives on the past of the Sulu Sultanate. My approach to historical perspective in The Sulu Zone 
would shift the focus in the debate about state formation and trade away from the western challenge 
to the indigenous local-regional response to that challenge, establishing slaves as primary historical 
actors. From the beginning of my book I announced my intention to see history 'from the other 
side', and not cast my narrative in conventional moulds [Warren 1981: xi-xii]. From the angle of 
vision of this alternative analytic perspective to 'top person's history' one can better understand 
what might be termed 'experience'. This is most apparent in the riveting portrait of the slave's 
'collective biography' [ibid. : 237-251 ; Sharpe 1991 : 25]. One thing this methodological approach 
has taught me about 'experience' is that the ethnohistorian should try, whenever possible, to read 
the lives of 'little people' positively, instead of reducing them to mythic-tragic categories like 'the 
oppressed' or 'the down-trodden'. Once the a-priori mythology of hierarchical inversion was re-
moved, the lines of experience and power within the society and culture of the Zone appeared more 
complicated and interesting. The Sulu Zone shows traces of this lesson by looking at the slaves 
and slave raider's lives in terms of the potential embodied in the fullness of their experience, that is 
of their history of success and failure, and, the optimism, albeit boundless at times, of these men 
and women contending with a world that was changing in China, a new one being born in the Zone, 
and cultural values that no longer functioned among drug addicted Taosug overlords and their 
families. The role and life experiences of Samal marauders and slaves in the face of changing 
fortunes as portrayed in my work, has an inherent historical significance for helping to establish 
and consolidate a reworking of Sulu's history, and, equally important, in the context of present day 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, for redefining the notion of what is historical. 
The approach I wished to pursue combined close attention to a specific period with a desire to 
understand how and why economic and social transformation occurred, and, to place the trader, 
slave raider and slave in context and circumstance. In time, I confined myself to that of late eigh-
teenth - and nineteenth- century global-capitalism. Within this framework I wanted to also situ-
ate my enquiry 'in as local a setting as possible' in order to reach the marginal and out of the way 
places of the Zone, to map its dimensions, to explore the big towns concerned with the lives of 
thousands and the social life of tiny atolls, to understand how the society of the Zone of which the 
slaves were a critical part worked, to describe on a minute scale what had not yet been described in 
the manner of the ethnographer or 'microhistorian' [Samuel 1981 : 414]. Firth used the term 'mi-
cro-sociology' in 1938 to describe such an approach, "much of the anthropologist's work [and I 
would add historian of maritime Southeast Asia in this case] has lain hitherto in what may be called 
micro-sociology- the study of small groups or small units in larger groups; of how relationships 
operate on a small scale, in personal terms" [ibid. : 413; Freedman 1979: 388]. 
From a unity of collective experience of individual slaves flesh-and-bone characters emerge, 
events take shape over time paralleling their lives, and in doing so the narrative crosses the bound-
aries between slavery and freedom, life and work, kinship and culture, trade and war, politics and 
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place in Malayo-Muslim maritime state. Microsocial analysis which hinges on building up layer 
upon layer of fully reliable detail enabled me to provide an account of the process of conducting 
slave raids across the seas of Southeast Asia, and an ethnographic image of what actually happened 
to people seized by the raiders in a particular time and place; we learn about what slaves routinely 
ate, how they dressed, the range of occupations and the experience of women and families, and of 
that flicker of a dream for some of escape, and letting days work into weeks and weeks into years 
with loneliness, sickness, old age and death following them- the evidence of one's eyes and heart 
that cannot be disregarded. Terms such as 'history from below' and 'history of the inarticulate' 
have been used by historians to describe this approach to history writing. The structure of experi-
ence is discernible, but the ethnohistorian must search for it in the Zone's past through the lens of 
the microscope. Historiographically, the danger lurks in relying solely on the telescope, the tradi-
tional method of macro-systemic historical enquiry, to discover, record and analyse the 'inner his-
tory' of this maritime cosmos. To be traditionally minded meant that important elements in the 
cosmos of culture of maritime traders, marauders and slaves, that had remained remote, blurred or 
hidden from history, would be passed over or missed completely. 
To write about an institution, 'culture', workplace and life as lived, the ethnohistorian must 
devote attention to the concrete and specific, using the techniques of microsocial analysis to see the 
past before him with new eyes. By reducing the scale of observation, microhistorical research 
revealed startling critical factors previously unobserved. Scanning the slave's universe at point 
blank range allowed me to explore a whole variety of contexts and key turning points in their 
lives. This technique provided a microscopic view, a window onto the world of the slave's history 
and society in the Zone, and a rich source of detailed material to map out the economic setting, 
urban-rural terrain, the specific character of slave raiding, and an acute sense of the complexity and 
variety of the slave's experience. In this way, I could move from what we can call 'microscopic 
examples' to the interpretation of the macro-'culture' of the Zone with its global-regional economic 
interconnections and interdependencies in the comtemporary world of the late eighteenth 
century. The historiographical implications of this approach, dealing with the experience of a slave 
community at a particular moment in time, as if under a microscope, was "to enlarge upon the ways 
in which one's forbears have made a difference in history" [Emmerson 1980 : 67]. To create such 
a history is to understand a totality of social and economic relations, and the historian must range 
widely to match new questions to new knowledge. 
Clarity, balance and the sifting of historical fragments is required in piecing together scraps of 
information about events, reactions and influences to shed light on the past of such a group, largely 
inarticulate and rarely documented as individuals. The effort to recover their story from abstruse 
sources, the raw material for both history and anthropology, is based on the capacity of a creative 
imagination to evoke the daily patterns and practises of a 'little people', slaves, and the conviction 
that carefully accumulated detail or 'thick description', emphasising both experience and explana-
tion, is the best way to take the true measure of their times. This interpretive technique of layer-
ing description was used by myself to compile information on events, intentionality and structural 
change in the lives of slaves from their statements, in order to 'thicken' aspects of the narrative, and 
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to also reach a sector of the Zone's population whose outlook and experiences had not been ad-
equately represented. The specific advantage claimed for this 'braided approach' [Burke 1992 : 
163] 13) to historical writing, which interweaves narration and analysis, is that it offered a means of 
reconciling a searching interest in the fate of the ordinary people of the Sulu Zone, and, local events, 
with a global understanding of the 'borderless' world of which they were fast becoming an integral 
part. The historian need not renounce the human element in history in pursuit of structure and 
process. The simplicity of this combination of historiographical approaches and a new form of 
narrative technique enabled me to construct a methodology capable of organising and explaining 
the world of the Sulu Zone while, at the same time, stripping away the colonial rhetoric from certain 
parts of the historical record of all its pretentiousness and mythic resonance. 
VI Towards a Synthesis 
After 1768, the forces of the global capitalist economy and imperialism pushed into the world of 
Eastern Asia, giving rise to a set of interconnected societies set out in a double context: on the one 
hand, strong core states, and, on the other, middling or weak peripheral ones, and, their relative 
position in this world system being either set on the global stage or in a local setting. During the 
late eighteenth century, a powerful secondary or peripheral state emerged within the Sulu Zone, an 
extensive economic region encompassing the southern rim of the Sulu sea and the whole of the 
Celebes basin. My understanding and discussion about global economic-cultural interconnections 
and interdependencies between the Sulu Zone and the China trade was based on the premise that 
these intersections were governed by particular economic systems and set in a specific era and 
locality. The Taosug lived in a singular time and time meant change. The Zone was a place where 
borders were becoming ever more porous, less bounded, less fixed, stimulated in large measure by 
global-regional flows of commodities, people and ideas ; a kind of powerful magnet whose force 
European and Chinese traders were attracted to because that's where a great deal of the exotica for 
Chinese cuisine and medicine and other commodities for the Canton market were being collected 
and processed. The Zone was fast becoming a vitally important Southeast Asian economic region 
at a periphery of the world system that both reflected and transcended its locality. What then is 
the importance of the Sulu Zone, as well as the China tea trade's complicated place within its 
'borderless' history? It has been an argument of my book that we cannot think of societies and 
cultures in isolation, as self-maintaining, autonomous, enduring systems [Wolf 1982: 390]. 
The rythmn of Chinese history has helped fashion the contours and patterns of Southeast Asia 
as a region both prior to and after the late eighteenth century European intrusion in the Zone. 
Unlike some historians, I felt it important not to ignore half of the economic activity of the Zone's 
international trade, the half initiated, organised and administered by the Taosug and Samal. An 
ethnohistorical strategy sent me back to the trade records and vital statistics to ask what was really 
going on in this state that had been labelled by various colonial powers as a hot bed of despotism, 
piracy and slavery. I developed a strong interpretive line in advocating the importance of the Sui-
13) On theoretically informed historical analysis and narrative or story-telling see Fischer [1970]. 
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tanate creating 'clusters' in the development of global-local enterprise in the Zone. Porter argues 
'clusters' create 'competitive advantage' by concentrating a state's industries in specialised, closely 
related areas of commerce, technology and social organisation, and location [Porter 1990]. Certain 
sets of economic and cultural practises that built regional competitive advantage were put into play 
because of the Sultanate's key location astride one of the main north-south China sea routes; nota-
bly, the specialised cultural-ecological adaptations of various peoples to the Zone's water borne way 
of life, and, their mastery of the seas; and, the systematic harvesting on a hitherto unprecedented 
scale of the unusual concentration of key commodities of the China trade (sea cucumber, pearls, 
birds nest) throughout the Zone. In his concept of 'competitive advantage', Porter describes 'clus-
ters' as existing in a conceptual 'diamond' structure, one which links production factors, such as the 
skilled labour of pearl divers, the infrastructure necessary to compete in a particular industry, for 
example, slave raiding, the nature of the domestic demand for the industry's products or services-
slaves, and the presence or absence of suppliers, to the local conditions governing how such indus-
tries were created, organised and managed, for example, by the Taosug. In addition, there was 
the level of domestic or regional competition. 
To what extent did the English discovery of tea as one of the great universal non alcoholic 
drinks accelerate the decline of China, contribute sharply to the rise of Sulu slave raiding, and 
create a man-made catastrophe with the widespread trade of opium for tea throughout Eastern 
Asia? The argument as you now know runs roughly as follows. The end of the eighteenth cen-
tury was an age of 'economic revolution' in the Zone in which labour demands grew larger and 
larger. To meet the unprecedented needs of the Chinese markets, Taosug rulers had to find more 
and more labour power. Sulu's 'principle number one' was specialisation. It found for the popu-
lations of the Zone a few key areas where the Sultanate set out to be the best in the local-regional 
context, the best in Southeast Asia and then, also, the best in the world. Those areas were highly 
focused local specialisations relating to Taosug social organisation of slave raiding as a permanent 
activity, and their local extractive industries, bringing key people and social groups together to 
build economic relationships, in order to then facilitate the process by which they carried on the 
redistributive economy. The slave raiders also in tum helped to enforce the collection of exotic 
commodities, thus establishing a coercion-extraction cycle which was an intended consequence of 
competition for resources and power by this go ahead state in the global economic arena. 
The mingling of commodities served not only as motors of change but as realised signs, signi-
fying that two or more worlds met as well. This meeting of commodities and peoples highlighted 
in different ways the interconnectedness of the modem world. These commodities led to a con-
tinuous redefinition of belonging to a place as either 'here' or 'there' and/ or as markers of social 
identity. Lives and cultures blended wherever commodities changed hands in the Zone. The 
Sultanate's trade had started along the coast of northeast Borneo when Europeans and Taosug 
found that each had key items of global commerce the other wanted. The Sulu and Samal desired 
European firearms, knives, kettles and textiles. The Europeans valued the Zone's natural prod-
ucts, especially birds' nest, sea cucumber and pearls. They traded, and both parties thought they 
were often getting a bargain. But their worlds and lives had been altered in the process, some-
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times irrevocably so. After 1768, the consequence of 'globalisation' accelerated by the world capi-
talist economy was that areas, from remote maritime villages and tribal long houses in the Zone to 
entire continents, were "caught up in processes which linked them to events that, though geo-
graphically distant, [were] culturally, economically, politically, strategically, and ecologically quite 
near [and] the distinction between 'here' and 'there' [broke] down" [Prewitt 1996: 15]. 
The individuals in this economic arena changed one another's lives by means of tens of thou-
sands of transactions conducted over nearly a century, involving artefacts and goods that reflected 
the people who manufactured them, and the global economic imperatives that bridged two worlds 
to facilitate trading them. When they traded commodities, Europeans and Chinese exchanged 
part of the signs and practises of their societies as well, which could tum out to have complex, 
devastating social consequences in the world of the Zone, as in the case of opium. Increasingly, 
particular artefacts played a role, albeit a critical one, as a bridge between their respective cultures 
and worlds. The impact of these unanticipated 'marrying' processes could be discerned in a myriad 
of everyday choices over such things as appropriate language and speech, fashion, interior decora-
tion and the characteristics of food and eating habits. The importance of stratification symbols 
brought luxuries from Europe and China like Waterford crystal, bone china and porcelain to trading 
enclaves in the tropical wilderness of the Zone. The Sultan of Sulu and leading datus had their own 
stores of wine, chocolate, brandy and cigars and served their guests on Chinese porcelain. In 
terms of what Mann calls a 'history of power' many of these commodities and artefacts were out-
ward symbols of hierarchy and social distinctions among the Taosug, and critically important to the 
self-maintenance of the trading world of the Zone [Mann 1986 : 490] .14J 
The large scale progressive intake of captive peoples from various parts of Southeast Asia and 
beyond also reflected Sulu's moving closer to Europe and China, economically and culturally. In 
the pages of my volume the world has changed through the intersections of the global trade economy 
centered around the Sulu and Celebes seas, as well as the Sultanate's critical place within it. Here, 
ordinary Southeast Asian farmers and fishermen are traumatically uprooted and forced to live in a 
distant economic region. A world comprised of winners responding to new economic opportuni-
ties of 'globalisation' and losers, those forced to live in ways unanticipated before that moment of 
capture and enslavement. Trade debts in J olo are paid off by slaves serving Taosug masters in the 
fisheries and forests of the Zone. The point is that tens of thousands of ordinary Southeast Asians 
lived among maritime peoples completely removed from those with whom they had been born and 
grew up. They found themselves abroad in the land/ seascape of the Zone, first, because advanced 
technologies and new social alignments made long distance slave raiding relatively easy and, sec-
ond, because revolutionary economic historical developments forcefully landed them in an unin-
tended place - the Zone. European traders joined with Taosug datus to spark one of the largest 
population movements in recent Southeast Asian history with hundreds of thousands of individuals 
sent into slavery across the Zone. By the start of the nineteenth century, slave identities in the 
Zone were being shaped and changed by the forces of 'globalisation' as distinctions of race and 
14) On the relationship between production, coercion and consciousness in history see Gellner[1988]. 
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culture blurred and broke down; thousands of 'outsiders' were being incorporated into the lower 
reaches of a rapidly expanding trading society. Sulu provides an exceptional case study of how a 
collective identity was established, made real, and took on a particular cultural content [ Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1992 : 44]. 
Culture and collective identities embodied many things for those who lived them, such as lan-
guage, music, dance and custom, as well as literature and philosophy. Learning a language 
(faosug, Samal, Malay, Spanish or Chinese) was more than just a means of communication for 
individuals being incorporated, or their masters. It was also a vehicle for learning about different 
thought processes from their own, enabling them to look at things from wholly different angles and 
to broaden their cultural vision and life chances in the Zone. Music is yet another example. As a 
Taosug, some datus were profoundly moved whenever they heard Spanish violin music played by 
their slaves. This was because the sound of the viola was now part of their cultural heritage due to 
social and economic processes of 'modernity' and the construction of new identities. There is no 
doubt in my mind, whatsoever, that by forcefully embracing such diverse peoples and cultures, the 
Taosug had the opportunity to enrich the fabric of their own lives and society. At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century they could count themselves extremely fortunate to be living in a 
'multicultural' environment. This assumption in tum assumes that the experience of 'the fugitive 
slaves of Sulu', cannot be separated from direct considerations of cultural practise, social structure 
and social power in any wider conception of the Zone's history. Finally, another focus of attention 
for myself was on the process of interaction between major economic trends and events involving 
Europe with China on one side and the structure of everyday life in the Zone on the other. How 
were these individuals and events constituted in diverse social contexts across the Zone, histori-
cally and culturally? [ibid. : 39, 44] The China tea trade from the standpoint of these individuals 
made the populating of the Zone yellow, black and white rather than just brown. All this ethnic 
edging up against one another and establishing ongoing relations involving conditions of slavery 
had been for the sake of a widely consumed mildly addictive commodity which had become a neces-
sity in the European diet and way of life - tea. 
Let me return now for a brief moment to Highland Southeast Asia. In The Sulu Zone, I stressed 
that domination involved control over the productive and reproductive power of human beings rather 
than over land as in Europe. The manipulation of ethnically diverse groups was crucial in this 
process. I compared the shifts of ethnic diversity in island Southeast Asia with the persistence of 
ethnic distinctiveness in parts of mainland Southeast Asia. But the mainland groups, situated pre-
dominantly in the highland areas, have developed and elaborated ethnic distinctiveness in response 
to the homogenizing advances of lowland states which, unlike their island counterparts, could often 
enforce their power within their domains. The highlands tribal peoples resisted incorporation 
into the larger traditions in lowland modernizing states by rejecting cultural assimilation through 
ethnic differentiation and by deliberately living on the edge of the periphery of these states. The 
island states, like Sulu, could not assimilate a wide variety of societies beyond the boundaries of 
their own trading ports and the upland client ethnic groups which did emerge across the Zone from 
the steam roller expansion of cross-cultural commerce and slave raiding, maintained their inde-
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pendence and cultural distinctiveness. However, with respect to the development of ethnic inter-
relations, indigenous markets and regional-local commerce, it must also be appreciated that ma-
rauding and cross-cultural trade were not always maritime-coastal. Slave raiding also extended 
over land in the interior of the large islands of Borneo and Sulawesi. In this context slave raiding 
and warfare provides insights into the pioneering migrations, life ways and world views of vigorous 
proud tribal peoples, who were slash-bum agriculturalists and ardent head-hunters, like the Ken yah, 
Torajah and Than. Violent raiding, coerced trade for jungle products and debt bondage are all 
problematic areas with respect to tribal autonomy to which some sort of response is also required 
by their insertion in the regional global political economy. 
For 80 years (1768-1848) the trade of the Zone flourished. Slavery drew more and more 
groups of people into the process of commodity accumulation. The 'culture' (s) and society of the 
Zone were fluid, with a global-regional trade system, attracting ever new objects and ideas into 
circuits of commodity exchange, with 'borders' that were often contested, redefined and contextu-
ally shifting. Then, in the aftermath of the Spanish conquest of Balangingi in 1848 and the exile of 
the Samal marauders to the far away Cagayan valley in northern Luzon, the redistributive economy 
reached a threshold. The western grooved cannon and gunpowder, which had attracted the Sarna! 
to Jolo as clients and suppliers of slaves, were now operating to drive them apart. There was a 
further progressive fragmentation of Samal groups because of Spanish incursions and disruption of 
the Zone's economy. The total collapse of the economic system only came with the concerted 
effort of Spain to end Sulu's autonomy. By 1878, the demise of the trading-raiding system stripped 
the Sultanate of any trace of its former importance as a major entrepot in the global-regional economy 
in Eastern Asia. 
The Sulu Sultanate was an exceptional case for ethnohistorical investigation because the his-
tory of the Zone demonstrated clearly the links between large economic and cultural systems and 
social mechanisms and institutions, on the one hand, and, on the other, the making of collective 
worlds of more localised smaller communities. In short, as Kenneth Prewitt, Head of the Social 
Science Research Council, puts it: 'The global-local notion is not a metaphor invented by social 
theorists" [Prewitt 1996: 16] rather, it was the lived experience of millions of people in the Zone 
and on several continents, inextricably bound to one another as product and fate. Part of the chal-
lenge for me had been to identify and link broad patterns and variations in interactions of the global 
economy and macrohistorical trends with the autonomous local history of a barely recognised eco-
nomic region in Southeast Asia. The long term changes that occurred in these patterns and trends, 
based on economic interconnections and imperatives of the world capitalist economy could only be 
perceived through their interdependent effects in the environment, on ideas, on events, and social 
and cultural transformation in the making of the world of the 'Zone'. 
The patterns I revealed throw up some unavoidable conclusions. The first is that the implica-
tions of my analysis of the economy, culture and society of the Sulu Zone perhaps, could be applied 
in a wider framework not only to elucidate the development of states and the elaboration of ethnic 
diversity in insular Southeast Asia, but also to develop a comparative framework with mainland 
states and cultures [Lieberman 1995 : 796-807]. A second conclusion concerns generalisations 
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that can be made about the nature of Southeast Asian history. It is this trans-historical - trans-
cultural- trans-disciplinary methodological approach of linking detailed research of a local situa-
tion to wider global-regional economic systems and issues, with particular reference to agency or 
'experience' that underpins my work. Thus, an examination of the structure of life of slaves in the 
Zone at the micro-social level challenges certain generalisations which have been made about the 
nature and historical evolution of the Sulu Sultanate. In addition, the long historical period of 130 
years, 1768-1898, reveals ways in which the global economy, trade commodities, population growth, 
environmental sustainability, economic transformation, colonial warfare and influence, were all re-
flected in the 'microcosm' of the slave's experience in the Sulu Zone. Finally, a third inescapable 
conclusion of The Sulu Zone entails something more: my ethnohistory not only involved an exten-
sion of the content and meaning of 'culture' and history, it also implied a revision of that content. 
What I have suggested in this volume is that in a new history of island Southeast Asia, the 'little 
people'- fishers, 'raiders', divers, traders, highlanders, forest dwellers, pioneers and slaves- both, 
men and women, should be visibly present, as part of the cultural landscape and environment of a 
series of regional-economic 'zone's, enmeshed in the hemispheric framework of the larger chang-
ing contemporary world of global cultural flows and economic interactions. The fundamental prob-
lems in the everyday lives of such maritime and tribal peoples - making their livings and losing 
them, entangled in globalising events beyond their own local geographic borders and worlds, is the 
work of future ethnohistorians of Asia, east by south. 
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